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DOES HISTORY DEFEAT STANDING 
DOCTRINE? 
Ann Woo/handler* & Caleb Nelson** 
According to the Supreme Court, the Federal Constitution limits 
not only the types of matters that federal courts can adjudicate, but 
also the parties who can bring those matters before them. In 
particular, the Court has held that private citizens who have suffered 
no concrete private injury lack standing to ask federal courts to 
redress diffuse harms to the public at large.1 When such harms are 
justiciable at all, the proper party plaintiff is the public itself, 
represented by an authorized officer of the government. 
Although the Court claims historical support for these ideas, 
academic critics insist that the law of standing is a recent "invention" 
of federal judges.2 Indeed, it is frequently said that " [t]here was no 
doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the twentieth century."3 
According to this view, the forms of action did much of the work of 
standing, defining when a plaintiff had the type of injury that, together 
with the defendant's breach of duty, would support a claim for relief. 
But judges did not otherwise inquire into standing; a court would deal 
with standing-related concerns simply by asking "whether the matter 
before it fit one of the recognized forms of action."4 Only in the 
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** Professor of Law and Albert Clark Tate, Jr., Research Professor, University of 
Virginia. A.B. Harvard, 1988; J.D. Yale, 1993. - Ed. For helpful comments on an earlier 
draft, we thank Michael Collins, Barry Cushman, Richard Fallon, John Harrison, John 
Jeffries, Daniel Meltzer, George Rutherglen, and participants in Virginia's 2003 Conference 
on Constitutional Law. 
1. See, e.g. , Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); cf Fed. Election 
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (holding that Congress can authorize private suits for 
harms that are widely shared, but only if each individual plaintiff's harm is sufficiently 
concrete to qualify as an "injury in fact"). 
2. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and 
Article Ill ,  91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Standing After 
Lujan?]; see also, e.g. , John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002) (asserting 
that the Supreme Court "fabricat[ed] the doctrineO of standing" in the twentieth century). 
3. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1009. 
4. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1988) [hereinafter Winter, The Metaphor]; see also Edward A. 
Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing 
Doctrine ls Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2251-52 & 
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twentieth century, so the story goes, did a "distinctive body of standing 
doctrine" develop.5 
For the Supreme Court's detractors, this claim has an important 
corollary. If the dominant view of justiciability from the Framing until 
the mid-twentieth century focused only on whether claims fit into the 
forms recognized by law and did not entail any separate notion of 
standing, then it more easily follows that the modern Court should not 
read standing doctrine into the Federal Constitution. According to 
widely accepted academic critiques, the Court is flatly wrong to claim 
historical support for a constitutional requirement of standing, and 
particularly for the requirement that private parties show some sort of 
individualized injury before they can proceed in federal court.6 
Building on prior work by Louis Jaffe and Raoul Berger,7 an 
impressive article by Steven Winter suggests that the principle of 
public control over public rights has only recently become dogma, and 
that earlier eras saw no constitutional objections to "the adjudication 
of group rights at the behest of any member of the public, without 
regard to the necessity of personal interest, injury, or standing."8 Cass 
n.63 (1999) (citing the many scholars who have suggested that "the question of standing is 
best treated as a question indistinguishable from whether the party has a right of action"). 
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1434 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law]; see 
also Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1395 (asserting that what Professor Winter calls 
"the syllogism of the forms," under which courts simply asked whether parties were 
presenting their claims in the form prescribed by positive law, "predominated until the 
middle of the twentieth century"). 
6. Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04 & n.5 (1998) 
(indicating that history supports the "triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability" 
that "constitutes the core of Article Ill's case-or-controversy requirement"), with, e.g. , 
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1004 ("[N]o one seriously believes that the Framers 
chose [the words 'cases' and 'controversies'] with anything like the Supreme Court's 
doctrinal framework in mind or that the Court's justiciability rulings are anything other than 
a judicially invented gloss on the Constitution."). 
7. See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional 
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818, 840 (1969) (arguing that "historically-derived 
constitutional compulsions" do not support "objections to the standing of a private 
individual to enforce a 'public right' "); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public 
Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 
(1968) (arguing that "whether the analysis proceeds in terms of history, logic or policy," the 
constitutional requirement of a "Case" does not require "a plaintiff who proffers for judicial 
determination a question concerning his own legal status"); cf Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to 
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1275 (1961) (conceding that 
some early American decisions were "antagonistic to citizen actions," but reading both 
English history and the evolution of American tradition to support some such actions). 
8. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1381-82; see also id. at 1374 (asserting that 
there was no conception of standing as a component of a constitutional case before the 
twentieth century); Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the 
Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 315 (2001) (noting with disapproval 
"[t]he Supreme Court's constitutionalization of standing doctrine over the past three 
decades" (footnote omitted)). 
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Sunstein similarly condemns the twentieth-century Supreme Court for 
importing what he calls "a private-law model of standing" into the 
Constitution.9 Drawing primarily upon mandamus practice and qui 
tam statutes, the critics treat history as firmly establishing the 
constitutionality of "the 'standingless' public action or 'private 
attorney general' model that modern standing law is designed to 
thwart. "10 
This Article sees the history differently. We do not claim that 
history compels acceptance of the modern Supreme Court's vision of 
standing, or that the constitutional nature of standing doctrine was 
crystal clear from the moment of the Founding on. The subsistence of 
qui tam actions alone might be enough to refute any such suggestion. 
We do, however, argue that history does not defeat standing doctrine; 
the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its 
constitutionalization does not contradict a settled historical consensus 
about the Constitution's meaning. 
To begin with, there was an active law of standing in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To be sure, early American 
courts did not use the term "standing" much, and modern research 
tools might therefore convince one that the concept did not exist.11 But 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century courts were well aware of the need 
for proper parties, and they linked that issue to the distinction 
between public and private rights. Courts regularly designated some 
areas of litigation as being under public control and others as being 
under private control. Within the area of private control, moreover, 
courts paid close attention to whether the correct private parties were 
before them. 
It is certainly true, as William Fletcher and other commentators 
have noted, that standing requirements often can be rephrased in 
9.  Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, supra note 5, at 1433 ("While 
the model is often justified by reference to the case or controversy requirement of article III, 
there is in fact no basis in that article or in any other provision of the Constitution for the 
view that the private-law model is constitutional in status."); see also id. at 1434-35 (claiming 
that the requirement of a private-law injury in public-law actions arose in the early 
regulatory era); Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 170-71 (asserting 
that practice "from the founding era to roughly 1920" provides "no evidence of 
constitutional limits on [Congress's] power to grant standing"). Professor Sunstein 
distinguishes between the need for a private cause of action (which he does view as a 
constitutional requirement for private litigation) and the need for a private injury (which he 
does not view as a constitutional requirement). See, e.g. , Cass R. Sunstein, Informational 
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639 
(1999) ("As a matter of text and history, the best reading of the Constitution is that no one 
can sue without some kind of cause of action."). 
10. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1396. 
11. See, e.g. , Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 169 & n.26 
(reporting the results of a LEXIS search for the word "standing," though acknowledging 
that this evidence is "crude"). 
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terms of the elements of a cause of action.12 But the issue of the proper 
parties to allege public and private injuries cut across various causes of 
action, and it also limited the arguments available even to people with 
valid causes of action. Because English precedents were mixed, 
moreover, American courts that resolved this issue were not always 
simply following well-established forms. In favoring a private-injury 
requirement for private litigation, their decisions were influenced by 
American ideas about the proper role of the judiciary, its relationship 
to the political branches of the state and federal governments, and the 
legitimate allocations of public and private power. 
Contrary to the claims of modern critics, moreover, the nineteenth­
century Supreme Court did see a constitutional dimension to standing 
doctrine. Admittedly, early cases often did not specify the extent to 
which standing doctrine was simply a matter of "general law" and the 
extent to which the Federal Constitution incorporated it. But in the 
cases dearest to the hearts of the standing critics - actions against 
federal and state governmental officials - the nineteenth-century 
Court explicitly discussed standing in constitutional terms. The Court's 
language, moreover, did not suggest that the constitutional issue 
would always vanish if only a legislature would give the plaintiff a 
statutory right to sue. Rather, with the exception of qui tam (which we 
discuss more thoroughly below), such indications as there were 
suggested that a legislatively created cause of action would not 
necessarily be enough for standing. 
Part I discusses some general manifestations of judicial concern for 
maintaining the distinctions between proper litigants of public and 
private rights. Part II shows that the Supreme Court saw these 
distinctions as having constitutional dimensions. Part III discusses 
whether the constitutional concerns would evanesce with 
congressional provision for a cause of action. 
12. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223, 229 
(1988) (stating that a standing decision determines whether the plaintiff has a right to 
judicial relief in a federal court and should be seen as addressing the substantive merits of 
the plaintiff's claim); Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An 
Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974) (arguing that standing 
issues would better be addressed by asking whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for relief). 
We do not take issue with Judge Fletcher's point that standing doctrine should be sensitive 
"to the particular right at issue and to the proper definition of the plaintiff class for that 
right." Fletcher, supra, at 249. In certain circumstances, however, we suggest that "proper 
definition of the plaintiff class" may exclude private litigants altogether, even when Congress 
has purported to make them proper plaintiffs. Cf id. at 224 (arguing for unfettered 
congressional power to create standing to litigate statutory rights, though recognizing 
restrictions on Congress's power to create standing to litigate constitutional rights). 
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I. THE "GENERAL LAW" OF STANDING 
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A. The Traditional Distinction Between Public and Private Rights 
Because much of the traditional discourse about standing was cast 
in terms of the distinction between "public rights" and "private 
rights," we start with some working definitions of these concepts. 
These definitions are based on historically recognized categories, but 
also have modern currency. 
Public rights are those that belong to the body politic.13 They may 
include interests generally shared, such as those in the free navigation 
of waterways, passage on public highways, and general compliance 
with regulatory law.14 The penal law (which includes not only criminal 
law but also fines and forfeitures recoverable through civil process) 
also defines various public rights.15 The penalties for violations of 
those rights are not measured strictly by private loss; like public law 
more generally, penal law focuses on vindicating the claims of the 
public rather than on compensating individuals.16 
Private rights, by contrast, are held by discrete individuals. Rights 
at the core of this category include an individual's common law rights 
in property and bodily integrity, as well as in enforcing contracts. 
While penal law also is concerned with invasions of private property 
and person, private rights may generally be distinguished by private 
law's focus on individual compensation (or the avoidance of private 
loss by injunctive remedies). 
13. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (discussing "the public 
rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social 
aggregate capacity"); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21 (N.Y. 1829) (Walworth, C.) 
(distinguishing between "public rights belonging to the people at large" and "the private 
unalienable rights of each individual"). 
14. See Lansing, 4 Wend. at 21 (Walworth, C.) (describing "[t]he right to navigate the 
public waters of the State and to fish therein, and the right to use the public highways" as 
public rights held by the people at large rather than by any individual citizen). 
15. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (characterizing crimes and 
misdemeanors as public law). 
16. See, e.g. , id. at *7 (noting that the law strives not only to "redress the party injured" 
by unlawful acts, in the manner described in Blackstone's volume on "private wrongs," but 
also "to secure to the public the benefit of society, by preventing or punishing every breach 
and violation of those laws, which the sovereign power has thought proper to establish, for 
the government and tranquility of the whole"); see also Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort, 
Old Wine in New Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND 
THE LEGAL PROCESS 233 (Randy Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1978) (arguing that the 
defining line between tort and crime is that the former decides as between two parties who 
should bear a loss); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of 
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1975) (stating that private enforcement occurs where detection 
is near 100%, whereas public enforcement tends to be in areas where detection is less certain 
and where penalties are set not merely to measure loss but also to make up for incomplete 
detection). 
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Of course, legislatures have considerable power to create new 
rights and to redefine existing rights in ways that affect whether they 
are public or private. Legislatures may add to public law by enacting 
new regulatory and criminal statutes, to be enforced by governmental 
officials. Similarly, legislatures may create statutory duties or 
"entitlements"17 owed to private persons; these entitlements can be 
treated as private rights for standing purposes, and the legislature may 
permit individuals to seek compensation for losses caused by their 
breach.18 In connection with a claim for private compensation, 
individuals may also be accorded the ability to collect 
supracompensatory penalties such as treble damages, even though 
these awards concededly have "penal" or public aspects.19 
Still, legislatures do not have total control over the line between 
public and private rights. Both state and federal constitutions limit the 
legislature's ability to assert public control over certain kinds of core 
private rights. Conversely, there are also constitutional constraints on 
privatizing certain core public rights. 
B. Standing and the PublidPrivate Distinction 
The question of which parties may properly come to court to 
vindicate these different kinds of legal rights is central to the issue of 
standing. In trying to address that question, American courts have 
traditionally drawn partly upon general principles of jurisprudence 
and partly upon distinctively American ideas about popular 
sovereignty, limited government, and the separation of powers. To the 
extent that these ideas played out differently in different jurisdictions, 
we will focus on the practices of the federal courts. But it is worth 
noting at the outset the ubiquity of the twin ideas of public control 
over public rights and private control over private rights. 
17. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 
885, 963-64, 987-88 (2000) (describing a category of property interests or entitlements that 
are protected by procedural due process but that are more easily subject to legislative 
divestiture than ownership interests). 
18. See, e.g. , Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 676 (1892) (reasoning that a statute 
making corporate officers liable for corporate debt if they signed a false certificate of capital 
stock created a private right "as it gives a civil remedy, at the private suit of the creditor 
only, and measured by the amount of the debt, it is as to him clearly remedial"). 
19. See, e.g., ISAAC 'ESPINASSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ACTIONS ON PENAL 
STATUTES, IN GENERAL 3 (photo. reprint 2003) (1st Am. ed. 1822) (noting that statutes 
authorizing injured parties to recover treble damages are "usually termed remedial," but 
acknowledging that they "are . . .  in some respects penal; for the sum recovered in actions 
under them is not generally confined to what amounts to actual amends, but goes much 
beyond it, and operates as a penalty against the party who has broken the statute"); see also 
Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as 
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003) (discussing 
competing conceptions of punitive damages in the nineteenth century). 
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Critics of modern standing doctrine maintain that in the early 
Republic, "American law provided several constitutionally acceptable 
models for the adjudication of group rights at the behest of any 
member of the public . . . .  "20 To the extent that these alternative 
models existed, however, they were areas of contest. As a general 
matter, moreover, the requirements of public control over public 
rights and private control over private rights predominated in 
American law. 
1. Standing to Seek Criminal Punishment 
An insightful recent article by Edward Hartnett provides a 
straightforward argument against the Supreme Court's attempt to 
read a requirement of private injury into the language of Article III. 
As Professor Hartnett notes, criminal prosecutions brought by the 
United States are universally acknowledged to be "Cases" within the 
meaning of Article III. But federal crimes usually do not inflict any 
particularized injury upon the United States. For Hartnett, it follows 
that "the word 'case' in Article III cannot reasonably be understood to 
require a personal, concrete, and particularized injury in fact."21 
This argument, however, is subject to an objection. The concept of 
proper parties is central to standing doctrine, and it may also infuse 
notions of a "Case." In particular, the requirements for a "Case" may 
be party-specific: just as a private plaintiff who has suffered an 
individual injury may be able to bring a "Case" against a defendant 
while other private parties cannot, so too invasions of public rights 
that cause diffuse injuries to the general public might support a "Case" 
between the public and the malefactor but not between any single 
individual and the malefactor. The fact that public officers can bring 
criminal prosecutions, then, does not disprove the hypothesis that 
federal courts can entertain private litigation only when private rights 
of a certain sort are at stake. 
Americans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were used to 
distinguishing between wrongs to private individuals and wrongs to 
the public at large. What distinguished crimes and misdemeanors from 
mere civil wrongs was that they "are a breach and violation of public 
rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a 
community."22 Thus, most early state constitutions affirmatively 
20. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1381. 
21. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 2249-50. While Professor Hartnett agrees with Professor 
Sunstein and other critics of standing doctrine about Article III, he reserves judgment about 
the circumstances in which congressional attempts to authorize "citizen suits" might impinge 
upon powers that Article II gives to the President. See id. at 2256-62. 
22. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also, e.g., State v. Rickey, 9 
N.J.L. 293, 305 (1827) (Ford, J.) ("The principles of the common law have clearly 
distinguished between public and private wrongs from the earliest ages to the present 
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required each indictment to specify that the defendant's conduct had 
been "against the peace and dignity of the State."23 
· 
To be sure, much criminal behavior violated an individual victim's 
private rights as well as the rights of the public at large.24 But criminal 
law enforcement was conceptualized as vindicating a shared public 
interest in the overall protection of private rights rather than any 
single individual's private rights themselves. As a result, criminal 
behavior potentially gave rise to two separate kinds of actions - the 
individual victim's tort action for compensation (generated by the 
behavior's invasion of the victim's private rights) and the public's 
criminal action for punishment (generated by the behavior's invasion 
of the community's public rights). 
Even in England, where the public/private distinction lacked the 
full force that it acquired in America,25 people had long understood 
the tort action to be under private control and the criminal action to 
be under public control. Writing about the state of nature, Locke 
asserted that crimes against the law of nature gave rise to "two distinct 
rights" - the right of "punishing the crime" for the sake of deterring 
similar conduct and the right of "taking reparation" for the individual 
damage caused by the crime.26 According to Locke, everybody in the 
state of nature enjoyed the right of punishment (because "in the state 
time."); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 94 (Pa. 1815) (argument of 
counsel) ("That the Courts have invariably preserved this distinction, between those cases 
which affect individuals only, and those which affect the public, will appear from a great 
number of cases which might be adduced . . . .  "). 
23. See DEL CONST. of 1792, art. VI,§ 21; Mo . CONST. of 1776, art. LVII; N.H. CONST. 
of 1784, pt. II ;  N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XV; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. :XXXVI; PA. CONST. 
of 1790, art. V, § 12; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 2; VA. CONST. of 1776; cf 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268 ("All [criminal] offences are either against the king's 
peace, or his crown and dignity; and are so laid in every indictment. "). 
24. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 ("[E]very public offense is also a 
private wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the 
community."). To a large extent, indeed, criminal law protected the same interests as private 
law; a crime's violation of the public rights lay in its tendency, if not punished, to set a 
"public evil example" encouraging other malefactors to steal private property or otherwise 
to invade private rights. See Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 94 (argument of counsel) 
(emphasis omitted). 
25. Part of the conceptual blurring of the public/private distinction in England may have 
stemmed from the king's dual role as both individual and sovereign. Consider, for instance, 
Blackstone's explanation of why the king was "in all cases the proper prosecutor for every 
public offense": because "the majesty of the whole community" was centered in the king, the 
law supposed the king to be "injured by every infraction of the public rights belonging to 
that community." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. This explanation, which 
effectively equated wrongs to the public at large with wrongs to the person of the king, had 
no counterpart in postrevolutionary America, where people saw no need to treat any 
particular individual as the embodiment of the public. 
26. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT§ 1 1  (6th ed. 1764), 
reprinted in THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION (J.W. Gough ed., Macmillan Co. 1947). 
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of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature"),27 
but "the [right] of taking reparation . . .  belongs only to the injured 
party."28 For Locke, this distinction persisted after the formation of 
civil society. Of course, individual citizens no longer enjoyed executive 
power; the "common right of punishing" was instead put into the 
hands of the public magistrate. Being in charge of this common right, 
"the magistrate . . . can often . . . remit the punishment of criminal 
offences by his own authority."29 No public officer, however, could 
"remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has 
received"; compensation for such private injuries was something that 
"he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own 
name, and he alone can remit."30 
Postrevolutionary Americans embraced this basic distinction. As 
John Marshall noted in 1800, "A private suit instituted by an 
individual, asserting his claim to property, can only be controlled by 
that individual. The executive can give no direction concerning it. But 
a public prosecution carried on in the name of the United States, can 
without impropriety be dismissed at the will of the govemment."31 
Throughout the United States, criminal prosecutions were 
conducted in the name and under the authority of the people in their 
collective capacity,32 and the legal rights that they vindicated were 
understood to be those of the public rather than of any private 
individual.33 In keeping with this view, rules of evidence that excluded 
the testimony of interested witnesses were not understood to prevent 
injured victims from testifying in criminal prosecutions; while victims 
might have some personal axes to grind, they had no legally 
27. Id. § 13. 
28. Id. § 11 .  
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31 .  Representative John Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, 
of the United States, on the Resolutions of the Hon. Edward Livingston, Relative to Thomas 
Nash, Alias Jonathan Robbins (March 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 
99 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984). 
32. Some early state constitutions explicitly provided that "[a]ll prosecutions shall be 
carried on in the name and by the authority of the State." S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 2; 
see also DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 21 ("Prosecutions shall be carried on in the name of 
the state . . . .  "); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. V, § 12 ("[A]ll prosecutions shall be carried on in 
the name and by the authority of the commonwealth . . . .  "). Even in states whose 
constitutions did not explicitly impose this requirement, prosecutions were conducted in the 
name of the state or its people. 
33. See, e.g., Bryant v. Ela, 1 Smith 396, 413 (N.H. 1815) (observing that " [t]he State is 
the party injured" by crimes); Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binn. 601, 606-07 (Pa. 1809) 
(Tilghman, C.J.) ("[T]he proceeding by indictment is not the right of the injured party, but of 
the public."). 
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cognizable interest in the vindication of public rights.34 For the same 
reason, the Supreme Court held early on that the federal 
government's prosecution of someone accused of attacking a Spanish 
diplomat was not a "Case[] affecting . . .  [a] public Minister" within the 
meaning of the Federal Constitution's Original Jurisdiction Clause.35 
As the Court explained, the case was entirely between the United 
States and the defendant, and the minister "has no concern . . .  in the 
event of the prosecution" even though "he was the person injured by 
the assault."36 
It is theoretically possible, of course, for a legal system to view 
criminal prosecutions as actions by the public to vindicate public rights 
while simultaneously allowing victims or other private individuals to 
conduct the prosecution on behalf of the public. That possibility is part 
of the historical debate about standing.37 Under English practice, 
although public officers remained in ultimate control of most criminal 
prosecutions (through the king's ability to grant pardons and 
Parliament's ability to enact statutes that effectively scuttled 
prosecutions), private individuals had considerable authority to 
initiate and prosecute criminal cases in the king's name.38 This practice 
34. See, e.g. , State v. Rickey, 10 N.J.L. 83, 84 (1828) ("The idea that a private person 
may be interested in a public prosecution, seems to be utterly discarded in law."); cf United 
States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 210-13 (1842) (acknowledging that special rules of 
law occasionally did give alleged victims a private interest in a successful prosecution, as 
when the law "entitled [a robbery victim] to a restitution of his goods upon conviction of the 
offender," but observing that even victims with such interests were often allowed to testify in 
prosecutions aimed at "suppress[ing] . . .  public crimes" rather than serving "the interest of 
the party aggrieved"). 
35. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
36. United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 469 (1826). 
37. Even today, some of the historical discussions of private prosecution are in service of 
arguments favoring greater individual involvement (or at least victim involvement) in 
prosecution. See, e.g., Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 357, 358 (1986); Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea 
Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 
CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 586 (1984). See generally BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND 
PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998). 
38. See, e.g. , Cardenas, supra note 37, at 360 ("The right of any crime victim to initiate 
and conduct criminal proceedings was the paradigm of prosecution in England all the way up 
to the middle of the Nineteenth Century."); PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 20 (1958) (indicating that even police prosecutions were "in 
theory" private prosecutions); cf Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private 
Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century England, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (observing that 
"by the mid-nineteenth century, most prosecutions were private in name only, as the 
'private' prosecutor was in most instances a policeman," but adding that "Parliament did not 
pass legislation to set up a national system of public prosecutors until 1879"); Philip B. 
Kurland & D.W.M. Waters, Public Prosecutions in England, 1854-79: An Essay in English 
Legislative History, 1959 DUKE L.J. 493, 497-99 (discussing the long-unsuccessful movement, 
dating back to the late eighteenth century, that led up to the 1879 statute). Even the 1879 
statute did not "establish[] a system of public prosecution similar to the one that exists in the 
United States." Cardenas, supra note 37, at 363; see also Klerman, supra, at 8 ("It was only 
with the passage of the 1985 Prosecution of Offenses Act that England established an 
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made its way to the American colonies. Ultimately, however, 
Americans rejected it. 
Joan Jacoby claims that " [b)y the advent of the American 
Revolution, private prosecution had been virtually eliminated in the 
American colonies."39 This statement is something of an exaggeration; 
some cities and states continued to give private individuals a 
substantial role not only in pressing charges, but even in conducting 
trials.40 But Jacoby is correct that a consensus was developing against 
giving private individuals free rein to represent the public. The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for example, noted that 
practice in England, where criminal trials ordinarily "are conducted by 
counsel employed by the private prosecutor," was "entirely different" 
from practice in Massachusetts, where the public attorney general was 
in charge of all criminal prosecutions.41 Other courts also emphasized 
this "striking and important difference in prosecutions for criminal 
offences here and in England. "42 
In explaining America's movement away from private 
prosecutions, courts emphasized the dangers of putting public power 
in the hands of private individuals who were neither selected by nor 
responsible to the people at large. In the course of asserting that "no 
indictment ought to be sent to the grand jury without the sanction and 
approbation of the solicitor-general," Tennessee's highest court 
highlighted the risk that "leaving prosecutions to every attorney who 
will take a fee to prosecute" would permit "the innocent to be 
oppressed or vexatiously harassed"; private prosecutors would not 
effective system of public prosecution, and even this legislation preserved a limited right of 
private prosecution."). 
39. JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 19 
(1980). 
40. See, e.g., ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 5 (1989) (describing the aldermen's courts of nineteenth­
century Philadelphia, in which "private citizens brought criminal cases to the attention of 
court officials, initiated the process of prosecution, and retained considerable control over 
the ultimate disposition of cases"); Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty 
Pleas: New York, 1800-1865, 22 J.L. & SoC'Y 443, 448-59 (1995) (noting that in New York 
City during the first half of the nineteenth century, private prosecutors or complainants not 
only initiated indictments but often were represented at trial by private counsel, who 
operated with the assistance of the district attorney). 
41. Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. 356, 364-65 (1838). 
42. State Treasurer v. Rice, 1 1  Vt. 339, 343 (1839). The Rice court explained: 
In this state, prosecutions for offences before the county court, which has original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of most offences, are conducted by a public officer appointed for 
that purpose, and responsible for the manner in which he discharges his duty. In 
England they are usually instituted and conducted by private prosecutors . . . .  
Id. ; see also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE§ 23, at 15 (Boston, Brown, Little & Co. 1866) ("In all the States of our Union, 
and in the tribunals of the United States, criminal prosecutions are carried on by a public 
officer, learned in the law, and chosen for this particular purpose."). 
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necessarily "feel the responsibility imposed by the oath of the 
solicitor-general(,] by his selection for the discharge of these duties, 
(and] by the confidence of the public reposed in him."43 The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana likewise worried that private prosecutions would 
reflect "the promptings of envy, malice, and all uncharitableness."44 
Even in states that continued for a time to permit private 
prosecutions, courts expressed concern that such prosecutions "are 
often commenced in very doubtful cases and for the most trivial 
offences," simply "to vex and harass an opponent."45 
While some states may have taken longer than others to follow the 
general trend, the federal government put public officers in control of 
prosecutions from the start. When the Judiciary Act of 1789 set up the 
federal courts, it also required a federal district attorney to be 
appointed for each of the thirteen judicial districts, and it gave this 
officer a "duty . . .  to prosecute in such district all delinquents from 
crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United 
States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be 
concerned. "46 Although private prosecutions occasionally occurred in 
territorial courts and in the courts of the District of Columbia, Article 
III courts were different: they did not recognize private citizens as the 
proper people to prosecute public offenses.47 As the U.S. Supreme 
43. Fout v. State, 4 Tenn. 98, 98-99 (1816). The court went on to cast the role of the 
publicly appointed prosecutor in constitutional terms: "The designs of the [state] 
constitution are disappointed by suffering the interference of any other . . . .  " Id. at 99. 
44. Markham v. Close, 2 La. 581, 587 (1831) (rebuffing a private individual's attempt to 
appear as public prosecutor, and invoking various considerations "which induce[] the state 
to take the prosecution of offences against her peace and her dignity into her own hands, 
and forbid(] the interference of private passions with the vindication of her justice"). 
45. Waldron v. Tuttle, 4 N.H. 149, 151 (1827). 
46. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
47. See, e.g., United States v. McAvoy, 26 F. Cas. 1044, 1045-46 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) 
(No. 15,654). The McAvoy court wrote: 
[T]here is no power conferred, by statute or usage, on the courts of the United States, 
to recognize a suit, civil or criminal, as legally before them, in the name of the United 
States, unless it is instituted and prosecuted by a district attorney legally appointed and 
commissioned conformably to the (Judiciary Act of 1789]. 
Id. ;  see also Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some 
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 293-96 (1989) (noting that after ratification of 
the Constitution, private individuals occasionally "helped initiate prosecutions (in federal 
court] by contacting the grand jury," but conceding that "they did not control the 
prosecutions once begun"); cf Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 994 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) 
(No. 18,255) (Field, J.) ("You will not allow private prosecutors to intrude themselves into 
your presence, and present accusations. Generally such parties are actuated by private 
enmity, and seek merely the gratification of their personal malice."). 
Qui tam statutes, which we discuss in Part III, may mark a limited exception to the idea 
that only public officers could bring criminal prosecutions to court in the name of the United 
States. Although most qui tam suits proceeded as civil actions in debt, common law practice 
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Court put it in 1842, "from the very nature of an indictment and the 
sentence thereon, the government alone has the right to control the 
whole proceedings and execution of the sentence."48 At least when it 
came to criminal prosecutions, then, private individuals were not 
understood to be able to go to federal court to vindicate public rights, 
whether on their own behalf or in the name of the American people 
at large. 
2. Standing to Seek Civil Remedies for the Invasion of Public Rights 
Even civil remedies for violations of public rights were not 
generally available at the behest of private plaintiffs, at least in the 
absence of some connection to a private injury.49 The law of "public 
nuisances" - a catch-all term for various invasions of public rights, 
ranging from corruption of public morals to obstruction of public 
highways50 - illustrates the point. Public authorities could get courts 
involved in suppressing such nuisances, either by imposing criminal 
punishments on those responsible51 or by issuing injunctions against 
ongoing violations of the public rights.52 But private individuals were 
much more limited in their ability to seek judicial relief for public 
nuisances. From Independence on, American courts enforced the 
"familiar" principle that " [t]he public authorities alone can complain 
of nuisances, while they remain public or general."53 Indeed, courts 
traditionally gave the relator the option of proceeding instead by the criminal process of 
information. 
48. United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 209 (1842). 
49. When a private plaintiff had suffered private injury, he might be able to bring a 
claim that had aspects of a public right. For example, parties with private injuries could often 
seek statutory penalties or punitive damages that exceeded their actual loss and that may 
have been designed at least in part to protect society as a whole from future wrongdoing. 
50. See, e.g., H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN 
THEIR VARIOUS FORMS; INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 22 
(Albany, Jon D. Parsons, Jr. 1875) ("Public nuisances, strictly, are such as result from the 
violation of public rights, and producing no special injury to one more than another of the 
people, may be said to have a common effect, and to produce a common damage."); F.H. 
Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LAW Q. REV. 480, 482 (1949) (referring to "public 
nuisance" as "that wide term which came to include obstructed highways, lotteries, 
unlicensed stage-plays, common scolds, and a host of other rag ends of the law"), quoted in 
William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 998 (1966). 
51. See, e.g. , William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 
999 (1966) (noting that " [p]ublic nuisance was a common-law crime" and that states also 
enacted statutes authorizing criminal punishments for various kinds of public nuisances). 
52. See, e.g., Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 98 
(1838) (noting that "a court of equity may take jurisdiction in cases of public nuisance, by an 
information filed by the attorney general"). 
53. Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128, 135 (1848); see also, e.g., Harrison v. Sterett, 4 H. & 
McH. 540, 548 (Md. Prov. Ct. 1774) (argument of counsel) ("[P]ublic wrongs being a general 
injury to the community, are to be redressed and punished by a public prosecution . . . .  "). 
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portrayed this rule as simply one manifestation of a broader idea: 
"Upon general principles, that common interest, which belongs 
equally to all, and in which the parties suing have no special or 
peculiar property, will not maintain a suit."54 
Commentators offered various explanations of this principle. Coke 
stressed the need for "avoiding of multiplicity of suites."55 Blackstone 
elaborated upon the same theme, observing that it is much less harsh 
to subject defendants to a single proceeding by public authorities than 
to permit "every subject in the kingdom . . .  to harass the offender with 
separate actions."56 American jurists added that in cases about injuries 
that were common to all, courts should "look to the rights of the 
whole community, and not . . .  those of a single individual"; the rule 
that " [f]or such an injury it is for the government to interfere, and not 
a private individual,"  therefore brought the proper parties into court.57 
It did not follow that private plaintiffs could never seek judicial 
relief from damage caused by a public nuisance. When the 
maintenance of a public nuisance caused a particular individual to 
sustain "special damage" - "an injury different in kind from that of 
which the public complains" - he could bring an action at law against 
the person responsible for the nuisance.58 If the nuisance was ongoing 
and threatened to cause him damage that was not merely "special" but 
irreparable, he often could also seek an injunction from a court sitting 
in equity. But it was well established, both at law and in equity, that 
"an action will not lie in respect of a public nuisance, unless the 
plaintiff has sustained a particular damage from it, and one not 
common to the public generally."5 9 Whether the plaintiff had stated 
such a private injury was a frequent matter of contest. 6() 
54. Barr v. Stevens, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 292, 293 (1808). 
55. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
56a (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1853) (1628). 
56. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219. 
57. O'Brien v. Norwich & W. R.R. Co., 17 Conn. 372, 376 (1845). 
58. Commonwealth v. Webb, 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen. Ct. 1828); see also, e.g. , Smith v. City 
of Boston, 61 Mass. 254, 255 (1851) (noting that a private plaintiff may seek compensation 
for damage caused by a public nuisance only if the damage is "peculiar and special" rather 
than being "common to the public"). 
59. Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565, 578 (1842) (adding that "the very 
object of all suits, both at law and in equity," is "[t]o preserve and enforce the rights of 
persons, as individuals, and not as members of the community at large"); see also, e.g. , Barr, 
4 Ky. (1 Bibb) at 293 ("[A] public nuisance is not the subject of a suit by a private individual, 
unless he has sustained some special injury thereby."); Harrison v. Sterett, 4 H. & McH. 540, 
548 (Md. Prov. Ct. 1774) (argument of counsel) ("[A]n action will not lie for a public 
nuisance without special damage . . . .  "); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 16 Serg. & Rawle 
390, 397 (Pa. 1827) ("In the case of a public nuisance, no one can support a private action, 
unless for some special grievance or injury . . . .  "); Webb, 27 Va. at 729 (stating the "rule of 
Law, which we find no where contradicted, that no private action can be maintained for a 
public nuisance, without special damage done to the party complaining"); cf 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219-20 (observing that "no person . . .  can have an action 
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To be sure, when a public nuisance was threatening special injury 
to a private plaintiff and the plaintiff was able to win an injunction 
against the nuisance, the same remedy that protected the plaintiff 
against private harm also benefited the public as a whole. As a 
conceptual matter, however, this benefit to the public was 
"incidental[)"; the private plaintiff was not thought of as representing 
the public, but rather as protecting his own private interest.61 As the 
U.S. Supreme Court put it in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Co. , when a public nuisance was causing a special and 
irreparable injury to a particular individual, it was redressable as "a 
private nuisance to the injured party."62 
In the Wheeling Bridge case, the plaintiff was the state of 
Pennsylvania, which complained that a bridge erected by the 
defendant in Virginia was obstructing the public right of navigation on 
the Ohio River. The Court permitted Pennsylvania to seek an 
injunction against this public nuisance, but not because the state was a 
proper plaintiff to bring suit on behalf of the people of the United 
States. The only reason that the state could proceed was that it was 
suffering "special damage" to its own property.63 As the Court had 
emphasized in an earlier opinion upholding the dismissal of a suit for 
want of proper parties, a private plaintiff seeking to enjoin a public 
for a public nusance" unless he "suffers some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the 
king's subjects"). 
60. See, e.g., Hughes v. Heiser, 1 Binn. 463 (Pa. 1808); see also O.B. Farrelly & Co. v. 
City of Cincinnati, 2 Disney 516, 522-37 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati 1859) (reviewing innumerable 
decisions on this question). 
61. Sparhawk v. Union Passenger R. Co., 54 Pa. 401, 421-22 (1867). 
62. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564 (1852); see also id. at 566 ("[A] public nuisance is also a 
private nuisance, where a special and an irremediable mischief is done to an individual."). 
The Court's rhetoric sometimes departed from this conceptualization. See, e.g. , Miss. & Mo. 
R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1863) (asserting that when a private plaintiff 
files a bill in equity to enjoin a public nuisance, he "sues rather as a public prosecutor than 
on his own account"); cf id. (acknowledging that the plaintiff "seeks redress of a continuing 
trespass and wrong against himself," but adding that he "acts in behalf of all others, who are 
or may be injured"). Still, the conceptualization of the plaintiff as a private actor continued 
to drive the Court's doctrine. See id. ("[U]nless he shows that he has sustained, and is still 
sustaining, individual damage, he cannot be heard."). 
63. See Wheeling Bridge, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 626 (emphasizing, in the Court's decree, 
that the defendant's bridge was causing "special damage" to Pennsylvania's proprietary 
interests); see also id. at 561 ("[Pennsylvania] asks from the court a protection of its 
property, on the same ground and to the same extent as a corporation or individual may ask 
it."). The state had invested millions of dollars in building canals and railroads linking inland 
cities in Pennsylvania to cities on the Ohio River, and the defendant's bridge allegedly was 
frustrating the purpose of these extraordinary investments. In addition, the defendant's 
obstruction of navigation on the river allegedly was causing Pennsylvania to lose toll revenue 
on its canals. 
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nuisance "cannot maintain a stand in a court of equity[] unless he 
avers and proves some special injury."64 
The same ideas applied as a matter of general jurisprudence in the 
states as well. Writing in 1899, William Hale summed up a century of 
case law as follows: 
The interest which an individual has in common with all other citizens or 
members of the state or municipality is insufficient to authorize him to 
maintain an action founded upon a public wrong affecting the people at 
large in the same manner. A party cannot vindicate the rights of others 
by process in his own name, nor employ civil process to punish wrongs to 
the public.65 
3. Issue-Specific Standing 
Critics of the modern Supreme Court often suggest that earlier 
generations had no concept of standing apart from the traditional 
forms of action.66 But even when the plaintiff's allegations fit into one 
of the established writs and therefore enabled him to bring a case to 
court, separate doctrines operated at an issue-specific level to keep 
private parties from litigating certain matters of public right. These 
doctrines may have been more susceptible to legislative change than 
doctrines affecting whether there was a "Case" in the first place. Still, 
these issue-specific rules reflected the strength of the general principle 
against private enforcement of public rights: even in the context of 
otherwise justiciable controversies between two private parties, 
litigants often could not claim the extracompensatory benefits of a 
duty owed to the public. 
64. Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 99 (1838) 
(affirming the circuit court's decree dismissing a bill that failed to allege special damage). 
Professor Winter describes the requirement of special damage in both Alexandria Canal Co. 
and Wheeling Bridge as "an artifact of the historic jurisdictional fight between law and 
equity." See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1420, 1421 n.269. Exactly what he means 
by this phrase is unclear, but one should not infer that the requirement of private injury was 
a special rule of equity. To the contrary, this requirement had long been enforced at law, and 
courts of equity quite naturally incorporated it when they began permitting some private 
people to seek injunctions against public nuisances. See Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 
Pet.) at 98. Throughout the nineteenth century, it was "well established" that no person 
could maintain a public·nuisance action in a court of law "unless he sustains a special 
damage therefrom, different from that sustained by the rest of the public." WOOD, supra 
note 50, at 655; see also id. at 835 (noting that no one could seek an injunction against a 
public nuisance "unless he could maintain an action in a court of law"). 
65. William B. Hale, Parties to Actions, in 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE 456, 472-73 (William M. McKinney ed., Long Island, NY, Edward Thompson Co. 
1899) (footnotes omitted}; see also id. at 473 (noting that "where a public wrong results in 
special and peculiar damage to an individual, differing in kind and not merely in degree from 
that suffered by the public at large, he may maintain an action individually to protect his 
interests"). 
66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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For example, courts used standing doctrines (and, in particular, the 
restriction on private invocations of public rights) to limit the impact 
of rules restricting the capacity of aliens to own land. At common law, 
when lands were sold or devised to an alien, "the king [was] thereupon 
entitled to them" and could launch proceedings to seize them; people 
who did not owe allegiance to the king could not "acquire a 
permanent property in lands," lest the nation become "subject to 
foreign influence."67 Although the United States sometimes entered 
into treaties waiving this principle with respect to the citizens of 
particular countries,68 and although individual states eventually 
adopted statutes deviating from the principle more generally,69 there 
was a time when many states adhered to the common law rule. 
Even in those states, however, private litigants generally could not 
assert the public's right to the land; the public (as represented by 
public officers) was in charge of when and whether to initiate the 
necessary "inquest of office" to seize the property. Thus, when a 
plaintiff sued someone for trespassing upon land in the plaintiff's 
possession, the defendant could not escape liability by proving that the 
plaintiff was an alien.70 Similarly, in ejectment and other controversies 
between rival land claimants, the party with the otherwise inferior 
claim could not prevail on the ground that his opponent was an alien 
or had an alien in the chain of title.71 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
67. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *371-72. 
68. See, e.g. , Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., art. 11 ,  8 Stat. 12, 
18, interpreted in Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 270-71 ,  275 (1817); see 
also Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-G.B., art. 9, 8 Stat. 
1 16, 122 (waiving the disabilities of alienage with respect to lands that were in British hands 
at the time of the treaty). 
69. See generally Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: 
Exploring the Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152 (1999) (discussing 
common law rules and statutory deviations from them). 
70. See, e.g. , Barges v. Hogg, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 485, 485 (Super. Ct. 1797) (conceding 
that an alien's purchase of property "will be for the benefit of the public whenever the State 
thinks proper to exert its right by causing an office to be found," but observing that "no 
individual can . . .  violate the possession of the alien purchaser" before then, and sustaining 
an alien's trespass action on the ground that her possession "is lawful as to all persons but 
the State"). 
71. See, e.g., M'Creery's Lessee v. Allender, 4 H. & McH. 409, 412 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1799); 
Sheaffe v. O'Neil, 1 Mass. 256, 257-58 (1804); Jackson v. Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. 109, 1 12-13 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802) (Radcliff, J.). But see Barges, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 485 (dictum) ("An 
alien cannot maintain ejectment or any action for the recovery of a freehold."), disavowed in 
Rouche v. Williamson, 25 N.C. 141, 146-49 (1842). 
The statement in the text requires one qualification. If the alien claimed to have 
acquired his title not by purchase, grant, or devise, but simply by operation of law, then his 
alienage was relevant and would defeat his claim. See, e.g. , Paul v. Ward, 15 N.C. 247, 248 
(1833) (observing that "the law will not cast an estate on [an alien]"). For instance, when a 
landowner died intestate with an alien heir, the law of inheritance skipped the alien and 
passed the estate to "those persons who would take it, if the alien were not in being." Id. If 
the alien nonetheless tried to take possession of the land, the true heir could prevail in an 
ejectment action by pointing out that title to the land had vested in him because his 
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uniformly held in such situations, "[n]o one has any right to complain 
in a collateral proceeding, if the sovereign does not enforce his 
prerogative. "72 
Courts commonly applied the same rules to corporations that 
violated state laws against land ownership. Pennsylvania law, for 
instance, provided that if a corporation purchased land in the state 
without the legislature's authorization, the land would be forfeited to 
the state.73 Both the Pennsylvania and the U.S. Supreme Courts 
analogized corporations that violated this rule to aliens who took 
property by purchase or devise: the corporations held a defeasible 
estate to the land, which could be divested only "by due course of law, 
instituted by the commonwealth alone."74 Similarly, it was widely held 
that when a state chartered a corporation but did not give it the power 
to own land, "a conveyance to [the corporation] is not void, but only 
voidable, and the sovereign alone can object."75 
Cognate problems arose under congressional legislation 
authorizing national banks but prohibiting them from owning real 
property except in certain circumstances. Debtors seeking to avoid 
foreclosure repeatedly invoked the banks' disability on land 
ownership. Just as repeatedly, however, the Supreme Court responded 
adversary was an alien. In this situation, the true heir was enforcing private rights that had 
already vested in him. 
72. Osterman v. Baldwin, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1 16, 121-22 (1867); see also Cross v. De 
Valle, 68 U.S. ( 1  Wall.) 5, 13 (1864) ("That an alien may take by deed or devise, and hold 
against any one but the sovereign until office found, is a familiar principle of law, which it 
requires no citation of authorities to establish."); Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson, 24 U.S. 
(11 Wheat.) 332, 351-58 (1826) (holding that when a state had granted land to an alien and 
later had purported to grant part of the same land to someone else, the initial grant to the 
alien was not "void," but rather gave the alien a defeasible estate that could be divested only 
through appropriate proceedings initiated by the state); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 1 1  U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 619-22 (1813) (holding that at common law, when a citizen's 
will devised land to an alien, the alien took the land "for the benefit of the state" but 
enjoyed title unless and until the state validly conducted a formal inquest of office). 
73. See, e.g. , Act of Apr. 6, 1833, 1832-33 Pa. Laws 167, 168 (reciting that "no 
corporation . . .  can . . .  purchase lands within this state . . .  without incurring the forfeiture of 
said lands to this commonwealth, unless said purchase be sanctioned and authorized by an 
act of the legislature thereof"). 
74. Runyan v. Lessee of Coster, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 122, 131 (1840) (holding that private 
defendants could not assert the corporation's disability in an ejectment action brought 
against them by the corporation's lessees); see also Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Rawle 313, 
322 (Pa. 1821) (analogizing the corporation to an alien and observing that while English 
cases left this point in doubt, "we have the highest authority in our own country for saying, 
that until some Act done by the Commonwealth . . .  to vest the estate in itself, it remains in 
the alien"). 
75. Nat'! Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 628 (1879) (citing cases); cf Murphy v. 
Farmers' Bank, 20 Pa. 415, 418-20 (1853) (holding that even when a corporation had abused 
the privileges conferred upon it by the state and its charter was subject to forfeiture, the 
corporation's usurpations of its franchise were "public wrongs and not private injuries," and 
so no one "except the Attorney-General[) or other officer of the Commonwealth" could 
seek a writ of quo warranto from the state's supreme court to dissolve the corporation). 
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that the disability was a duty owed to the government and not to 
private parties.76 Courts had the same reaction in disputes about 
federal land grants; when junior claimants sought to raise technical 
defects with the procedures that the Land Office had used to grant 
title to the otherwise senior claimant, courts sometimes told them that 
any complaints belonged solely to the government.77 
Rules of this sort, which put the power to enforce forfeitures in 
public hands, both preserved the legitimate exercise of public 
authority by public officials and limited the vulnerability of the aliens 
or corporations to self-interested enforcers. When private parties 
sought to avoid mortgages on the ground that national banks could 
not hold real estate, the Court noted that the proper public authorities 
could use the sanction of dissolution to punish wanton violations of 
corporate charters, and " [a] private person cannot, directly or 
indirectly, usurp this function of the government."78 Similarly, the 
Court praised the rules that kept private adventurers from 
complaining about aliens in someone else's chain of title as a means of 
"protect[ing] the individual from arbitrary aggression."79 
4. Is Mandamus a Counterexample? 
Steven Winter does not deny that most private litigation in the 
early Republic fits what he calls "the private rights model of 
adjudication,"80 under which private litigants generally cannot initiate 
suits to vindicate public rights. He concedes that the common law 
forms of action are consistent with that model,81 and he acknowledges 
that "the common law forms of action dominated the legal process and 
jurisprudential thought of the time."82 He insists, however, that the 
76. See, e.g. , Swope v. Leffingwell, 105 U.S. 3 (1881) (affirming a state court's dismissal 
of a bill to enjoin the sale of real estate); Matthews, 98 U.S. at 629 (reversing a state court's 
injunction against a sale); see also Reynolds v. Crawfordsville First Nat'! Bank, 112 U.S. 405 
(1884) (holding that the bank was not forbidden by charter from holding property in this 
case, and also noting the general principle that where a corporation is incompetent by 
charter to take real estate, a conveyance to it is not void, but voidable, and only by the 
sovereign). 
77. See, e.g., Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 647 (1882) ("It does not lie in the 
mouth of a stranger to the title to complain of the act of the government with respect to it. If 
the government is dissatisfied, it can, on its own account, authorize proceedings to vacate the 
patent or limit its operation."). 
78. Matthews, 98 U.S. at 629. 
79. Governeur's Heirs, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) at 356. 
80. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1377 & n.29 (crediting this phrase to 
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 
1365-68 (1973)). 
81. See id. at 1396 (referring to "the private rights model of the seven common law 
forms of action"). 
82. Id. 
708 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:689 
private-rights model does not exhaust early practice. As evidence of 
the parallel existence of "non-individualistic, group models of 
adjudication," he points to actions seeking writs of mandamus against 
defendants accused of breaching public duties.83 Joined by Professor 
Sunstein, he suggests that courts of the early Republic routinely 
permitted private citizens "who had no personal interest or injury-in­
fact" to initiate and conduct mandamus actions on behalf of the public 
at large.84 
Professor Winter concedes that mandamus practice was 
"underdeveloped" in the federal courts;85 that is, early federal courts 
did not actually entertain mandamus actions initiated by private 
relators who lacked private injury. On the strength of English history 
and practice in the state courts, however, he suggests that federal 
courts would have entertained such actions if not for technical 
problems unrelated to standing.86 
English practice with respect to mandamus is disputed. Professor 
Jaffe reports that King's Bench used mandamus and other prerogative 
writs "primarily to control authorities below the level of the central 
government," such as local governments and other corporate bodies 
that derived their powers "from statute, decree, or charter."87 While 
Professor Jaffe presents cases strongly suggesting that private 
individuals sometimes sought mandamus against these entities without 
showing any special personal interest,88 Bradley Clanton maintains 
that the evidence does not support this conclusion.89 In any event, 
mandamus actions against "local and discrete authorities,"90 brought 
by residents of the locality in question, do not present the purest 
possible case of public-rights litigation; members of a municipal 
83. Id. at 1391. Professor Winter also points to statutory qui tam actions, which we 
discuss in Part III. 
84. See id. at 1377, 1402-03; see also Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public 
Law, supra note 5, at 1434 n.9 (suggesting that mandamus practice, "especially at the origin 
of the republic," was inconsistent with "modern notions of injury in fact"). 
85. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1405. 
86. Id. 
87. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1269-70. 
88. See id. at 1270 (noting that "[t]he reported cases were almost uniformly ones in 
which mandamus served the plaintiff as a 'remedy,' " but asserting that "the lists of cases in 
the digests strongly suggest the possibility that the plaintiff in some of them was without a 
personal interest" (footnote omitted)). 
89. See Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original 
Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1043-47 (1997) (acknowledging unclarity in the 
case reports about the nature of some parties' interests, but finding evidence in other legal 
writings that "mandamus was not available to 'disinterested strangers' "). 
90. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1270. 
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corporation have interests in the corporation's conduct that are not 
shared by members of the public at large.91 
To the extent that English practice does support Professor 
Winter's "public rights model," however, American departures from 
that practice are all the more striking. Writing in 1834, Chief Justice 
Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts identified the "general rule" as 
" [ u ]ndoubtedly" being the following: 
[A] private individual can apply for a writ of mandamus only in a case 
where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some 
particular right to be pursued or protected by the aid of this process, 
independent of that which he holds in common with the public at large; 
and it is for the public officers exclusively to apply, where public rights 
are to be subserved.92 
If the modem critics of standing doctrine are correct about English 
practice, then American courts that required private relators to allege 
some special private interest were not simply applying the settled 
common law forms. 
It is true that some state c::ourts did not follow Shaw's dictum; while 
they agreed that individuals had no litigable interest of their own in 
"wrongs against the public,"93 they understood the law in their states 
to authorize individual citizens to seek mandamus on the public's 
behalf. In 1837, New York's Supreme Court of Judicature held that 
any citizen could initiate a mandamus action in the public's name 
against local governmental officers who allegedly were breaching 
duties owed to the public,94 and the state's court of last resort 
eventually approved this practice.95 By the Civil War, at least three 
91. Cf Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923) (discussing "the peculiar 
relation of the [municipal] taxpayer to the corporation," which resembles in some ways the 
relation "between stockholder and private corporation," and observing that "the relation of 
a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different"). 
92 In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 105 (1834). But see Winter, The Metaphor, 
supra note 4, at 1404 n.167 (asserting that Shaw was wrong to call this proposition the 
"general rule," but citing no contrary American cases decided before 1837). 
93. Doolittle v. Bd. of Supervisors, 18 N.Y. 155, 159 (1858). 
94. See People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); see also 
People ex rel. Fuller v. Bd. of Supervisors, 18 How. Pr. 461, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860) 
(following Collins); People ex rel. Blacksmith v. Tracy, 1 How. Pr. 186, 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1845) (citing Collins approvingly in dictum). 
95. See People ex rel. Stephens v. Halsey, 37 N.Y. 344, 347 (1867). Even in New York, 
mandamus was a limited exception to the general rule giving only public officers authority to 
litigate on behalf of the public. See Doolittle, 18 N.Y. at 158-59 (rejecting a suit for injunctive 
relief where "no injury peculiar to [the plaintiffs] is threatened," and adding that "[t]he 
general rule certainly is that for wrongs against the public, . . .  the remedy, whether civil or 
criminal, is by a prosecution instituted by the state in its political character, or by some 
officer authorized by law to act in its behalf"); see also id. at 163 ("No private person 
or number of persons can assume to be the champions of the community, and in its be­
half challenge the public officers to meet them in the courts of justice to defend their offi­
cial acts."). 
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other states had followed suit,96 although an equal number of states 
had explicitly rejected the New York practice.97 
Professors Winter98 and Sunstein99 emphasize the 1875 case of 
Union Pacific Railroad v. Hall, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
indicated that "a decided preponderance of American authority" 
supported a limited version of the New York rule.100 Although the 
state decisions had in fact been evenly divided, this statement led 
some more states toward the New York camp.101 But whatever the 
practice in state systems, federal courts had never before indicated that 
private relators could seek mandamus on behalf of the American 
public without regard to their own private injury.102 Indeed, even Hall 
was not understood to establish such a rule. In Hall itself, the Court 
held that the private parties seeking mandamus had suffered special 
injury of the sort required in public-nuisance cases,103 and subsequent 
courts did not understand Hall to authorize "citizen suits" seeking 
mandamus on the public's behalf against errant governmental 
officials.104 
96. See County Comm'rs v. People ex rel. Metz, 11 Ill . 202, 208 (1849) (citing and 
following Collins); Hamilton v. State ex rel. Bates, 3 Ind. 452, 458 (1852) (same); State ex rel. 
Rice v. County Judge, 7 Iowa (7 Clarke) 186, 202 (1858) (same). 
97. See Sanger v. County Cornm'rs, 25 Me. 291, 296 (1845); People ex rel. Russell v. 
Inspectors of the State Prison, 4 Mich. 187, 188-89 (1856); Heffner v. Commonwealth ex rel. 
Kline, 28 Pa. 108, 112 (1857); see also People ex rel. Drake v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 4 
Mich. 98, 101-03 (1856) (declining to issue mandamus at the behest of a relator "who is only 
interested in common with all other citizens of the state in the subject matter of complaint," 
though reserving the possibility of exceptions "if the attorney-general or prosecuting 
attorney . . .  were absent, or refused to act without good cause"); cf Halsey, 37 N.Y. at 347 
(acknowledging that the New York rule adopted in Collins "differ[s] from that which 
prevails in many of the other States"). 
98. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1404. 
99. See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 174. 
100. 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875) ("There is, we think, a decided preponderance of American 
authority in favor of the doctrine, that private persons may move for a mandamus to enforce 
a public duty, not due to the government as such, without the intervention of the 
government law-officer."). 
101. Compare, e.g. , Pearsons v. Ranlett, 110 Mass. 1 18, 126 (1872) ("Undoubtedly, when 
a private citizen applies for a writ of mandamus, he must show that he has some special 
interest in the subject matter different from the interest which every other citizen has."), 
with Attorney General v. City of Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 479 (1877) (echoing Hall). 
102. Cf Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 
818 (2004) ("(T]hat individuals who had suffered no particularized injury had causes of 
action in limited instances in English and state courts does not prove that the American 
constitutional structure contemplated the same practice in federal courts."). 
103. See Hall, 91 U.S. at 355. 
104. See, e.g. , United States ex rel. Alsop Process Co. v. Wilson, 33 App. D.C. 472, 479 
(1909). That court wrote: 
In all the cases relied upon by relator [including Hall], mandamus was granted to secure 
to the relators rights which they were entitled personally to enjoy. Measured by this 
test, it is apparent that the relator has no such interest in the subject-matter of this 
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To explain why federal courts had never had occasion to embrace 
the New York rule more vigorously, Professor Winter points to limits 
on their subject-matter jurisdiction.105 As a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, Marbury v. Madison106 held that Congress could not 
give the U.S. Supreme Court original jurisdiction to entertain suits 
seeking mandamus against nonjudicial officers; as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, M'Intire v. Wood107 held that most lower 
federal courts also lacked this jurisdiction. As Professor Winter 
concedes, however, the federal circuit court for the District of 
Columbia did have jurisdiction over requests for mandamus against 
executive officers, and the Supreme Court could review its decisions 
controversy as to entitle it to the writ . . . .  It is a mere volunteer in this proceeding, and, 
as such, is without standing. 
Id. ; see also United States ex rel. Am. Silver Producers' Ass'n v. Mellon, 32 F.2d 415, 418 
(D.C. 1929) (holding that the relator must show "that he will sustain a personal injury by the 
threatened violation"). 
105. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1405. In a separate argument, Professor 
Winter also points to Hayburn 's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), in which an evenly divided 
Court refused to let Attorney General Edmund Randolph seek a writ of mandamus 
requiring a lower federal court to entertain William Hayburn's petition for disability 
benefits. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1400 ("The Court's deadlock on this 
issue eliminated the availability of the English relator action: The relator could hardly 
invoke the 'standing' of the attorney general if the attorney general had none."). The Court 
in Hayburn's Case may not actually have reached the issue of standing. See Maeva Marcus & 
Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 527 
(inferring from Justice Iredell's notes that the issue that divided the Court instead concerned 
the Attorney General's ability to act independently of the President) .  But if Professor 
Winter is correct, then this aspect of Hayburn's Case rests on the public/private distinction: it 
suggests that a public officer was not the proper party to pursue Hayburn's private 
entitlement in court. 
After the Court refused the motion that Attorney General Randolph filed as a 
representative of the government, Randolph returned to the Court as the lawyer for 
Hayburn, and he filed a new motion in that capacity. 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 38 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter DHSC]. Professor Winter argues that the Court's willingness to entertain the 
new motion cuts against modern standing doctrine. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, 
at 1401 ("The Hayburn Court accepted Randolph's invocation of a representational model, 
premised on a part-whole structure, that did not require allegation of specific, personal 
injury: Randolph, a representative of the whole, was allowed to proceed with the mandamus 
petition on behalf of Hayburn, a part."). This argument, however, rests on the mistaken 
premise that the Attorney General was still proceeding as a lawyer for the government, and 
that the government was being allowed to "rais[e] the rights of third parties." Id. In fact, 
Randolph was not appearing in his official capacity but rather as private counsel for 
Hayburn. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409 (noting that after the rejection of his 
original motion, the Attorney General appeared "at the instance, and on behalf of Hayburn, 
a party interested"); see also FEDERAL GAZETTE, Aug. 15, 1792, reprinted in 6 DHSC, 
supra, at 68, 68 (noting that after the Court divided on his motion ex officio, Randolph "then 
appeared as counsel for the invalids"). In those days, it was not unheard of for the Attorney 
General to represent private clients; Randolph did the same thing in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 131 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994). 
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
107. 1 1  U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813). 
712 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:689 
on appeal.108 In exercising that jurisdiction, neither of these courts 
suggested that private individuals suffering no special private injury 
could seek mandamus to vindicate public rights. To the contrary, the 
Supreme Court spoke of the circuit court's mandamus jurisdiction as a 
means to enforce "private rights,"109 and opinions from Marbury on 
highlighted the need for private relators to allege private injuryY0 
* * * * *  
The above discussion suggests that standing issues were alive and 
well in arguments about whether private parties could vindicate public 
rights, and cannot be explained entirely by reference to common law 
requirements for causes of action. To be sure, in public-nuisance cases, 
the Court was following English rules in requiring a private injury. But 
accor<ling to the standing critics' own history, American courts that 
required private injury in mandamus cases were not constrained by 
the established forms. The common law forms also did not compel 
Americans to reject private prosecution. Both of these areas reflect 
the influence of the more general notion that public officers pursue 
public rights and private parties pursue private rights. Even when a 
private plaintiff had stated a proper claim for relief, moreover, the 
American courts used issue-specific standing rules to prevent parties 
from usurping the power of government. Central concerns were that 
the control of public rights should remain in the hands of public 
officials and that individuals should be free from arbitrary 
enforcement at the hands of private actors. 
II. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF STANDING 
Critics of the Supreme Court's approach to standing may respond 
that even if "citizen suits" were not familiar features of the common 
law, the federal courts still did not see standing as a constitutional 
issue. According to Steven Winter, 
a painstaking search of the historical material demonstrates that - for 
the first 150 years of the Republic - the Framers, the first Congresses, 
and the Court were oblivious to the modern conception either that 
108. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 615-22 (1838). 
109. See, e.g. , id. at 619 (basing its interpretation of the circuit court's mandamus 
jurisdiction in part on the principle "that in every well organized government the judicial 
power should be coextensive with the legislative, so far at least as private rights are to be 
enforced by judicial proceedings"); cf Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 97 
(1860) (noting that mandamus "is not now regarded as a prerogative writ," but rather "in 
modern practice is nothing more than an action at law between the parties"); Kendall v. 
Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 100 (1845) (similar). 
110. See infra Part II.A. 
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standing is a component of the constitutional phrase "cases or 
controversies" or that it is a prerequisite for seeking governmental 
compliance with the law.1 1 1  
Cass Sunstein similarly suggests that the Supreme Court did not start 
discussing standing in constitutional terms until the 1940s.112 
Contrary to the critics' claims, however, the Supreme Court did see 
some standing issues as constitutional, expressing particular concerns 
about unwarranted judicial interference with the federal and state 
political branches. While the nineteenth-century Court did not always 
make the constitutional nature of its concerns as clear as the 
twentieth-century Court has, the more recent decisions are continuous 
with historical tradition. 
A. Mandamus Continued 
Mandamus actions, though hailed by the Supreme Court's modem 
critics as evidence against the Court's position, actually suggest the 
constitutional dimensions of requiring private injury for actions 
against governmental officials. From Marbury on, the Supreme Court 
not only focused on private rights in mandamus proceedings against 
executive officers, but also portrayed that focus as an important aspect 
of the federal government's separation of powers. The Court 
disclaimed any pretensions "to intermeddle with the prerogatives of 
the executive" or "to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, 
perform duties in which they have a discretion"; instead, " [t]he 
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of 
individuals." 1 13 But when an executive officer was illegally refusing to 
perform a ministerial duty, and when "an individual sustains an 
injury" by virtue of this refusal, the "injured individual" could 
appropriately seek mandamus from a court with jurisdiction.114 The 
Court continued to articulate the twin requirements of a ministerial 
duty and an individual injury throughout the century.115 
111 .  Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1374. 
1 12. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 169, 177; see also supra 
note 9. 
113. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. 
114. See id. at 170-71;  see also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 509 (1840) 
(argument of counsel) (emphasizing Marbury's distinction between ministerial acts 
"affecting individual or private rights" and "those of a public or political character"). 
115. See, e.g. , M'lntire, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 506 ("Had the 1 1th section of the judiciary 
act covered the whole ground of the constitution, there would be much reason for exercising 
this power [to issue the writ of mandamus] in many cases wherein some ministerial act is 
necessary to the completion of an individual right arising under laws of the United 
States . . . .  "); Kendall v. United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 616-17 (1838) 
(echoing this language from M'lntire and holding mandamus appropriate because "the case 
now before the Court, is precisely one of that description"); see also Bd. of Liquidation v. 
McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875) ("[W]hen a plain official duty, requiring no exercise of 
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B. Evidence from the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction 
Matters brought to the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction 
elicited some of the Court's clearest statements of the requirement of 
a private right to contest governmental action. Article III allowed the 
Court to exercise original jurisdiction over various "Controversies" to 
which states were parties, including those in which a state was 
proceeding against a citizen of another state. 116 One might wonder why 
suits brought by states would shed any light on the requirements for 
private litigation. But the nineteenth-century Court did not view its 
original jurisdiction as an appropriate place for states to prosecute the 
run of public rights; a state that wanted to launch a criminal 
prosecution or an enforcement action seeking fines or penalties had to 
start off in its own courts.1 17 States were allowed to use the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction primarily to pursue claims for property, 
breach of contract, or the like - civil claims of the same sort that an 
ordinary private litigant might assert. As a result, the Court's view 
about the kinds of interests that states could pursue in its original 
jurisdiction reflected prevailing sentiments about the kinds of claims 
that private litigants could pursue in lower federal courts. 
As Henry Paul Monaghan has noted, the Supreme Court's 
comments on this point reflected its understanding that private 
plaintiffs had to assert "concrete 'private rights. '  "118 What is more, the 
Court associated this requirement with the Constitution. 
After the Civil War, for instance, the State of Georgia sought to 
challenge the constitutionality of federal statutes establishing military 
government in the South, and it asked the Supreme Court to enjoin 
the execution of those statutes. But in Georgia v. Stanton,119 the Court 
held that the state's dispute with federal executive officers had not 
taken the form of "a case . . .  appropriate for the exercise of judicial 
discretion, is to be performed, and performance is refused, any person who will sustain 
personal injury by such refusal may have a mandamus to compel its performance"). 
1 16. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2. 
117. See, e.g. , Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 300 (1888) (refusing to take 
jurisdiction even over a suit to enforce a judgment that a state had won in a separate penal 
action brought in state court), overruled in part by Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 
296 U.S. 268 (1935); see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Gwin v. Breedlove, 
43 U.S. 29, 37 (1844). See generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 
81 VA. L. REV. 387, 422-31 (1995). 
118. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE 
L.J. 1363, 1367 (1973). Professor Monaghan goes on to condemn the Court's approach to the 
state-as-party cases, calling it "wholly unsatisfactory." Id. at 1368. The specific complaint 
that prompts this comment, however, is not so much that the Court required private litigants 
to show private injury, but rather that the Court treated states like ordinary private litigants. 
See id. 
1 19. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867). 
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power."120 The reason was simple: "No case of private rights or private 
property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement, 
is presented by the bill . . . .  "121 To be sure, Georgia did have some sort 
of interests at stake; it was seeking protection for "the rights of 
sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate 
existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and 
privileges."122 But these "merely political rights" were not interests of 
the sort that could support litigation. To present the court with a 
justiciable controversy, "the rights in danger . . .  must be rights of 
persons or property. "123 
Stanton was no innovation; it relied heavily upon Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia,124 in which the Marshall Court had refused to entertain the 
tribe's suit for an injunction to repel Georgia's legislative and military 
encroachments upon Cherokee land and governance. Although 
resting his decision upon the fact that the Cherokee Nation was not a 
"foreign state[]" within the meaning of the Original Jurisdiction 
Clause, Chief Justice Marshall strongly suggested that at least some of 
the interests asserted by the tribe were not "the proper subject for 
judicial inquiry and decision."125 In a concurrence, Justice Johnson 
declared the Cherokees' entire bill "unfit for the cognizance of a 
judicial tribunal," because the interests at stake did not present "a case 
of meum and tuum in the judicial . . .  sense."126 
Even Justice Thompson, who dissented, agreed that " [t]his court 
can grant relief so far only as the rights of person or property are 
drawn in question, and have been infringed";127 he simply believed that 
the Cherokee Nation had stated a justiciable · claim about the 
deprivation of certain specific property interests (such as the tribe's 
right to the possession and use of some mines), and that the Court was 
therefore wrong to throw out the entire bill. In language that the 
Stanton Court would quote with approval, he conceded the limits on 
the kinds of rights that litigants could seek to protect in federal court, 
and he linked those limits to the constitutional separation of powers: 
120. Id. at 76. 
121. Id. at 77. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 76. 
124. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
125. Id. at 20 ("On several of the matters alleged in the bill, for example on the laws 
making it criminal to exercise the usual powers of self government in their own country by 
the Cherokee nation, this court cannot interpose; at least in the form in which those matters 
are presented."). 
126. Id. at 28-29 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
127. Id. at 51 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
716 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:689 
I certainly . . .  do not claim, as belonging to the judiciary, the exercise of 
political power. That belongs to another branch of government. The 
protection and enforcement of many rights, secured by treaties, most 
certainly do not belong to the judiciary. It is only where the rights of 
persons or property are involved, and when such rights can be presented 
under some judicial form of proceedings, that courts of justice can 
interpose relief.128 
Although various Justices in both Stanton and Cherokee Nation 
adverted to the line between judicial and political power, their 
opinions cannot be written off as manifestations of the political­
question doctrine rather than the constitutional dimensions of 
standing.129 The problem the Justices were discussing was not that the 
legal issues raised by the plaintiffs were nonjusticiable, but simply that 
the plaintiffs were not proper parties to litigate those issues because 
they did not have the right sort of interests at stake.13° The Court stood 
ready to decide the legality of Georgia's Cherokee statutes and 
Congress's Reconstruction statutes when proper parties presented 
themselves in appeals from criminal prosecutions131 and habeas 
cases.132 But private litigation could not proceed when "rights of 
persons or property" were not at stake. The Court reiterated this 
principle throughout the nineteenth century.133 
C. Private Rights of Another: State- and Private-Party Cases 
The nineteenth-century Supreme Court's tendency to hold states 
that invoked its original jurisdiction to the same standing requirements 
as private parties had a corollary: injuries to another private party did 
128. Id. at 75 (Thompson, J., dissenting); see also Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 75 
(quoting this passage and others to the same effect). 
129. Cf Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1437 (arguing that in Stanton, "the 
Court did not apply the private rights model as an alternative to the intermediate public 
rights model, but rather as an alternative to viewing certain matters as nonjusticiable 
'political questions' ") . 
130. See, e.g. , DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-
1888: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 303-04 (1985) (concluding that "the trouble [in Stanton] 
was . . .  not with the issue but with the party"). 
131. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
132. See Ex parte Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2 (1866). 
133. See, e.g. , California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) ("The 
duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or 
of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it."); Marye v. 
Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 330 (1885) ("[N]o court sits to determine questions of law in thesi. 
There must be a litigation upon actual transactions between real parties, growing out of a 
controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person or property."); see also, e.g., 7 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 229, 237 (1855) ("We provide courts of justice . . .  in order that parties may have 
lawful means to collect debts, recover damages for private injury, and otherwise obtain 
adjudication of their private rights of person or property . . . .  "). 
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not ordinarily suffice to give states standing. In particular, states 
generally could not bring cases to vindicate the private rights of their 
citizens.134 Because a state that tried to do so could not point to any 
litigable interest of its own, the Court did not view it as a proper party 
to a genuine case or controversy, even if state law purported to let the 
state bring suit. Thus, when New York and New Hampshire passed 
legislation purporting to let those states sue Louisiana on behalf of 
individual citizens to whom Louisiana owed money, the Court 
rebuffed the suits; in the Court's view, "one State cannot create a 
controversy with another State, within the meaning of that term as 
used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by assuming the 
prosecution of debts owing by the other State to its citizens. "135 By 
contrast, when the individual creditors had genuinely assigned their 
bonds to a state, so that the right to collect upon the bonds was truly 
the property of the state itself, the state could properly invoke the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.136 
This sort of analysis was not confined to the Supreme Court's 
original jurisdiction. In exercising its appellate jurisdiction over suits 
brought in lower federal courts by individual plaintiffs, the Court also 
treated averments of private injury as a prerequisite for private 
litigation. In Williams v. Hagood, 137 for instance, an individual plaintiff 
sought to challenge the constitutionality of two South Carolina laws 
that allegedly impaired the obligation of contracts into which the state 
had entered. Although the federal courts could certainly have 
considered the constitutionality of those laws "if the complainant had 
placed himself in a position to invoke our judgment," the Supreme 
Court held that he had failed to do so: "His bill does not aver that he 
has been injured, or will be injured, by this legislation . . . .  "138 In the 
absence of such an averment, "(t]he question presented to the court 
is . . .  merely an abstract one; such a one as no court can be called 
upon to decide . . . .  "139 
134. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 288 (5th ed. 2003) (noting the rule that "a state, when 
it is merely sponsoring the claims of a small number of individual citizens, has no standing to 
sue either another state or a private party"); see also id. at 289 (noting that the Court was at 
first equally "unreceptive" to state attempts to sue as parens patriae). In the twentieth 
century, the Court moved away from the notion that, for standing purposes, states invoking 
its original jurisdiction should be treated like private parties invoking the jurisdiction of a 
lower federal court. See id. at 289-92 (discussing the extent to which states can now launch 
parens patriae litigation in the Supreme Court to protect "quasi-sovereign interests - i.e., 
public or governmental interests that concern the state as a whole"). 
135. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883). 
136. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904). 
137. 98 U.S. 72 (1878). 
138. Id. at 74. 
139. Id. at 75 (agreeing with the lower federal court's decision to dismiss the bill); cf 
Marye v. Parsons, 1 14 U.S. 325, 330 (1884) (disallowing a suit to enjoin state officers from 
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The twentieth-century Court's decisions in Massachusetts v. Mellon 
and Frothingham v. Mellon140 - sometimes portrayed as ushering in a 
radical break with the past141 - are continuous with these older cases. 
In concluding that neither Massachusetts nor an individual federal 
taxpayer had standing to challenge a federal spending program that 
allegedly exceeded Congress's enumerated powers and thereby 
invaded the sovereign authority of the states, the Court explicitly 
invoked the justiciability language of both Stanton and Cherokee 
Nation.142 Like Georgia's challenge to military Reconstruction, 
Massachusetts's challenge to the federal statute implicated " [n]o rights 
of the State falling within the scope of the judicial power" and hence 
fell outside of the federal courts' jurisdiction.143 The individual 
taxpayer's claim was no better; the only additional feature it presented 
was a suggestion that the program would increase the burden of 
federal taxes, and a private plaintiff's assertion "that [s]he suffers in 
some indefinite way in common with people generally" did not give 
her the basis for "a judicial controversy" in her own right.144 
Ill. LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING 
The opinions discussed above suggest that, contrary to modern 
critics' claims, the nineteenth-century Supreme Court did see standing 
as a constitutional concern. But even if the critics were to 
acknowledge this point, they might nevertheless argue that the 
constitutional issues would have vanished if only legislation had given 
the would-be plaintiffs a statutory right to sue. Everyone agrees, after 
all, that Congress has considerable leeway in recognizing legal 
refusing to accept bond coupons for taxes, and explaining that because the plaintiff was not a 
taxpayer, the litigation was not presented in a posture that was "judicially determinable"); In 
re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 496 (1887) (using similar reasoning); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 
52, 64-65 (1886) (similar). By contrast, the Court would decide the questions at issue in those 
cases when a taxpayer who had tendered the coupons presented a claim, particularly if he 
had suffered a seizure of property after the tender. See, e.g. , Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 
U.S. 270 (1884). 
140. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
141. See, e.g. , Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1009-10 (treating Frothingham as an 
innovation); Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1444-45 (arguing that while 
"Frothingham makes historical sense as a case about the availability of an equitable 
remedy," it "raised constitutional considerations that helped lead to a modern conception of 
standing"); id. at 1376-77 (suggesting that to the extent Frothingham saw a constitutional 
dimension to standing, it had no nineteenth-century support). 
142. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 483-85. 
143. Id. at 485. 
144. Id. at 486-89; see also Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (indicating that 
"the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered 
according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted" is not a private litigable interest 
of the sort that will support a "Case" within the meaning of Article III). 
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interests and creating causes of action that were unknown at common 
law. Some critics of modern standing doctrine. see this power as 
sufficiently far-reaching that the legislature, if it so desires, can give 
each citizen a litigable interest in the legality of governmental action. 
Cass Sunstein, indeed, suggests that there was a determinate original 
understanding on this point: "[F]rom the founding era to roughly 
1920[,] . . .  [n]o one believed that the Constitution limited Congress' 
power to confer a cause of action. "145 
This suggestion of consensus is wrong.146 To be sure, early qui tam 
statutes do provide some support to Professor Sunstein's position. As 
we explain below, however, that support is weaker than critics of 
modern standing doctrine suggest. At the same time, other historical 
145. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 170. 
146. Professor Sunstein seeks support for his suggestion from the well-accepted 
distinction between real-world harms (damna) and invasions of legal rights (injuriae). See id. 
at 170-71 ;  see also Fletcher, supra note 12, at 249; Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 
1397. As Professor Sunstein observes, these are distinct concepts; the legal system inevitably 
makes choices about which real-world interests to protect, and it is quite possible to suffer 
damnum absque injuria (harm without an actionable wrong). With this point established, 
Professor Sunstein slides quickly to the conclusion that injuria - the invasion of a legal right 
- has traditionally been the essential prerequisite for private litigation. See Sunstein, What's 
Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 171. In fact, however, there is considerable historical 
support for the proposition that private suits will not lie for injuria absque damno any more 
than they will lie for damnum absque injuria. See, e.g., Cable v. Rogers, 81 Eng. Rep. 259, 
259 (K.B. 1625) (Dodderidge, J.) ("[I]njuria and damnum are the two grounds for the having 
all actions . . .  : if there be damnum absque injuria, or injuria absque damno, no action 
lieth . . . .  "); Ashby v. White, 87 Eng. Rep. 810, 810-11 (K.B. 1703) (Gould, P.J.) ("[A]n 
injuria sine damna . . . will not bear an action, for both must necessarily concur to maintain 
the action; for things must not only be done amiss, but it must redound to the prejudice of 
him that will bring his action for it."); Lynn Corp. v. London Corp., 100 Eng. Rep. 933, 939 
(K.B. 1791) (Kenyon, C.J.) ("[I]t is against the general principles of the law that a party, who 
has not received any injury, should compel another to answer him in a Court of Justice."). 
Admittedly, there is historical support for the contrary proposition too. Two of the three 
decisions just cited were reversed by the House of Lords, albeit without any broad 
statements telling courts to entertain actions for injuria without regard to damnum. See 
London Corp. v. Lynn Corp., 101 Eng. Rep. 822 (H.L. 1796) (indicating that the Corporation 
of London could seek what amounted to a declaratory judgment about the right of its 
freemen to be exempt from tolls and port duties imposed by other municipalities); Ashby v. 
White, 1 Eng. Rep. 417, 418 (H.L. 1704) (permitting plaintiff to "recover his damages 
assessed by the jury" in his lawsuit against a local sheriff for maliciously and wrongfully 
refusing to let him vote in an election for Parliament). Early American authorities, 
moreover, can be cited on both sides of this question. Compare Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 
29 F. Cas. 506, 507-08 (C.C.D. Me. 1838) (No. 17,322) (Story, J.) (criticizing English 
authorities who continued to maintain "that injuria sine damno is not actionable," though 
doing so in the context of a controversy that plainly would satisfy the modern Court's 
requirement of injury in fact), with JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
AGENCY § 236 (Boston, Little & Brown 1839) (endorsing the view that "to maintain an 
action, both [wrong and damage] must concur; for damnum absque injuria, and injuria 
absque damno, are equally objections to any recovery"), and 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW 
DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 636 (4th ed. 1852) 
("Injury without damage or loss will not bear an action."). Still, the modern Supreme Court 
certainly is not flying in the face of some well-settled historical understanding when it 
suggests that both injuria and damnum are necessary for private litigation. 
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evidence casts doubt upon the idea that statutory rights to sue 
automatically sufficed to create constitutional "Cases" or 
"Controversies," regardless of the real-world interests at stake. We do 
not claim that modern standing doctrine sprang fully formed from the 
Philadelphia Convention or that the constitutional nature of standing 
was universally appreciated from day one. But neither is the opposite 
true; the public/private distinction upon which modern standing 
doctrine rests does have historical support, and the notion that the 
Constitution incorporates that distinction even as against Congress 
does not contradict any determinate original understanding. 
A. Evidence of Limits on Legislative Power to Confer Standing 
Again, we can start by considering the nineteenth-century Court's 
treatment of suits brought in its original jurisdiction. As we have seen, 
the Court's opinions frequently suggested that only certain kinds of 
interests - "rights of persons or property" - would support private 
litigation in federal court.147 These opinions, moreover, gave few 
indications that a statutory right to sue would automatically supply the 
necessary private interest. To the contrary, when states tried to 
legislate to themselves causes of action - as New York and New 
Hampshire did in attempting to enforce their citizens' debt claims in 
the Supreme Court - the Court was unimpressed. Even with a 
statutory right to sue, the states still lacked real-world interests of the 
sort that would support litigation, and hence they were not parties to a 
cognizable case.148 
In other respects too, the Court has traditionally held that 
whatever pleading rules or local statutes might say, the constitutional 
concept of a "Case" or "Controversy" focuses on the underlying 
interests that are genuinely at stake. In Browne v. Strode,149 for 
instance, the Marshall Court focused on the concrete interests at stake 
to conclude that a particular suit was a "Controversy" between a 
citizen of Virginia and a British subject even though the parties of 
record were all citizens of the same state.150 This approach was not 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 123 and 127-128; see also supra note 133. 
148. See supra note 135 and accompanying text; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra 
note 1 17, at 443 n.216 (indicating that states generally had legislative authorization before 
suing in the Supreme Court). 
149. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). 
150. See id. at 303; see also Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61,  
68 (1809) (argument of counsel) ("The constitution does not speak of the name on record[,] 
of the nominal party; it speaks of 'controversies' . . . .  The question is not, what names appear 
upon the record, but between whom is the controversy; who are the real litigants."). 
Statements of this sort might seem inconsistent with Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). There, the Court held that the Bank's suit against some 
individual officers of the State of Ohio, seeking to restrain their execution of an 
unconstitutional state statute, was not a "suit . . .  commenced or prosecuted against [a state]" 
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simply an excuse for extending federal jurisdiction; federal courts used 
the same interpretation of Article III to reject jurisdiction when the 
underlying interests at stake belonged to citizens of the same state.151 
Similar logic undergirded the Marshall Court's conclusion that Owings 
v. Norwood's Lessee,152 an ejectment suit brought from state court, was 
not a "Case[] . . .  arising under . . .  [a] Treat[y]" within the meaning of 
Article III and hence did not lie within its appellate jurisdiction. 
Although the defendant had argued that the plaintiff's claimed title 
rested on a state's violation of a treaty, and although this argument {if 
true) would have defeated the plaintiff's right to ejectment under state 
law, the defendant was not claiming that the treaty protected his own 
right to the land; the Supreme Court therefore concluded that the 
"Case" between the plaintiff and the defendant did not arise under the 
treaty.153 
Admittedly, these early decisions are only suggestive; they read 
Article III to incorporate a notion of proper parties (defined in terms 
of real-world interests), but they did not involve congressional 
attempts to confer standing. Conclusions on that issue are necessarily 
inferential, because the nineteenth-century Supreme Court rarely 
faced federal statutes purporting to authorize private plaintiffs to sue 
governmental parties without the traditional accoutrements of a suit. 
But in 1911, when the Court squarely confronted such a statute in 
Muskrat v. United States,154 it held the suit-authorizing legislation 
invalid. A 1902 federal statute had entitled everyone who was a citizen 
of the Cherokee Nation on September 1, 1902, to share in the 
distribution of Cherokee lands and funds.155 In 1906, Congress adopted 
a new statute restricting the property rights that were being distrib-
within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. In explaining this conclusion, Chief Justice 
Marshall delivered a broad dictum "that, in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, 
it is the party named in the record." Id. at 857. All that Osborn really held, however, was 
that a genuine "Controversy" existed between the Bank and the individual state officers and 
that the state itself was not an indispensable party to a suit seeking to restrain the officers' 
conduct. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 846-47, 858-59; see also In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 
487-88 (1887) (taking this view of Osborn). Later Supreme Court decisions therefore 
continued to apply the rule of Browne v. Strode. See, e.g., McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
9, 14 (1844) (reaffirming Browne v. Strode and asserting that Article III "look[s] to things 
not names - to the actors in controversies and suits, not to the mere forms or inactive 
instruments used in conducting them, in virtue of some positive law"). 
151. See Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (holding that 
an ejectment action in which the real parties in interest were citizens of the same state did 
not trigger diversity jurisdiction even if the nominal plaintiff was a lessee from a different 
state, because the constitutional concept of a "Controversy" focused on the parties whose 
litigable interests were genuinely at stake). 
152. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809). 
153. See id. at 347-48. 
154. 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
155. See Act effective July 1,  1902, 32 Stat. 716. 
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uted and permitting people born after 1902 to participate in the 
distribution. Concerned about legal challenges, Congress also 
authorized a few people who had been enrolled in the tribe as of 1902 
(and who therefore wanted to attack the constitutionality of the new 
statute) to seek what amounted to a declaratory judgment against the 
United States in the Court of Claims, with an appeal as of right to the 
Supreme Court. Despite this explicit statutory authorization, however, 
the Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a "Case" or 
"Controversy" within the meaning of Article III, essentially because 
Congress had provided for the suit to be brought against the wrong 
defendant. Although the United States might have been thought to 
have some abstract interest in defending the constitutionality of its 
statute, this was not the sort of interest that would support litigation, 
even if Congress said that it was.156 As for the people who benefited 
from the 1906 statute, they certainly had litigable interests adverse to 
the claimants, but those interests were not genuinely at stake; the 
private beneficiaries were not before the court and would not be 
bound by a judgment declaring the 1906 statute unconstitutional.157 
Critics of modern standing doctrine might try to explain Muskrat 
as simply demonstrating that Congress cannot authorize people to 
seek advisory opinions from federal courts - a principle that the 
critics generally accept.158 This response, however, acknowledges that 
Congress does not have unfettered power to define the interests that 
will support litigation in federal court; to distinguish requests for 
advisory opinions from true "Cases" and "Controversies," a court 
must distinguish interests that support litigation from those that do 
not.159 In any event, the problem in Muskrat - the lack of a proper 
156. See 219 U.S. at 361 (asserting that "the United States . . .  has no interest adverse to 
the claimants," and explaining that the suit was not designed "to assert a property right as 
against the Government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs because of action 
upon its part"). 
157. See id. at 362 (emphasizing that a declaratory judgment against the United States 
"will not conclude private parties, when actual litigation brings to the court the question of 
the constitutionality of such legislation"). The private beneficiaries apparently were not the 
only possible defendants. The following year, the Court reached the merits in the context of 
a suit brought against individual federal officials to enjoin them from performing their duties 
under the 1906 statute. See Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912). 
158. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 4, at 2251 n.61; Sunstein, Standing and the 
Privatization of Public Law, supra note 5, at 1474 n.206; Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, 
at 1374. But cf Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, supra note 5, at 1479 
(arguing that "the question whether an injury is merely ideological or instead legal is one of 
positive law; there is no pre- or post-legal metric for distinguishing between the two"). 
159. Suppose, for instance, that Congress passed a statute giving people a legal right to 
avoid psychological unease caused by uncertainty about the meaning of the U.S. 
Constitution, and providing that two people who disagree about the Constitution's meaning 
can sue each other in federal court for a declaratory judgment about who is correct. It seems 
highly doubtful that such a statute, purporting to give each side a personal right to the 
resolution of uncertainty, would suffice to transform an otherwise abstract dispute into a 
constitutional case. Cf, e.g. , Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 note (1792) (reprinting 
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defendant - is normally thought of as a standing issue, currently 
embodied in the requirements of causation and redressability.160 
One might be tempted to respond that having an improper 
defendant - that is, a defendant against whom one cannot obtain 
redress for the violation of a duty (no matter to whom owed) -
presents a different question than having a plaintiff whose private 
interests will be unaffected by a decree. But whether one casts the 
problem in terms of standing or in terms of the constitutional bar on 
advisory (or nonbinding) op1mons, concerns about improper 
defendants are closely related to concerns about improper plaintiffs. 
Even critics of modern standing doctrine concede that to have a 
constitutional "Case" or "Controversy," both sides must have 
cognizable interests at stake.161 For an interest to be genuinely at 
stake, moreover, the court's decision must be binding on its owner in 
the event the other side wins.162 And for private parties, the 
nineteenth-century Court repeatedly indicated that the requisite sorts 
of interests were at stake "only where the rights of persons or property 
are involved."163 
To be sure, the government can maintain litigation over public 
rights that do not fit that description. The public's interest in punishing 
criminal behavior, for instance, is an interest capable of supporting 
litigation in federal court. 164 For a public right of this sort to be 
genuinely at stake, however, the public must itself be party to the case 
in such a way as to be bound by the resulting judgment, in the sense 
that a judgment for the other side would bar the government from 
relitigating the same claim. When a private plaintiff who lacks 
authority to bind the public is proceeding in his own right, this 
condition is not satisfied. In such situations, the plaintiff needs to have 
a private interest of his or her own to litigate; otherwise, no sufficient 
interest will be at stake on the plaintiff's side, and the clash of interests 
necessary for a "Case" or "Controversy" will not exist. 
letters indicating that the mere existence of a statutory right to come to court does not 
automatically mean that rights of person or property are at stake in the sense necessary to 
support a constitutional case). 
160. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege 
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 
redressed by the requested relief."). 
161. See, e.g. , Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of Citizen and 
Taxpayer Suits, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 18 (2002) (acknowledging that a "Case" or 
"Controversy" requires the existence of "two parties with adverse interests"). 
162. See Marshall, supra note 31, at 96 (noting that in order to have a "Case" within the 
meaning of Article III, "[t]here must be parties to come into court, who can be reached by 
its process, and bound by its power; whose rights admit of ultimate decision by a tribunal to 
which they are bound to submit"). 
163. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Hartnett's emphasis 
on this point). 
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Critics of standing doctrine suggest that Congress can always 
create the necessary private interest simply by declaring that each 
individual has a personal legal right to avoid his or her share of a 
diffuse harm to the public as a whole. To the extent that a defendant's 
conduct really does impose some concrete personal harm on each 
individual member of society, the Supreme Court has no objection to 
this point. 165 As the Court's doctrine suggests, however, not all public 
rights lend themselves to this sort of disaggregation; for instance, a 
citizen's naked interest in a government official's compliance with the 
law will not suffice. The mere fact that Congress says an individual has 
a private litigable interest in such a dispute, moreover, does not 
automatically make it so. As we have seen, there is considerable 
historical support for the view that a private lawsuit is not a "Case" or 
"Controversy" unless certain kinds of real-world interests are at 
stake,166 and there is little historical support for the notion that each 
individual citizen can always be given a private litigable interest in 
avoiding diffuse harms to the public as a whole.167 
Critics also suggest that even if Congress cannot always get around 
standing doctrine by giving individuals private interests in formerly 
public rights, Congress can simply authorize individuals to litigate on 
behalf of the public, thereby latching onto the public's ability to bring 
suit over diffuse public rights. But if a loss by the private individual 
would not bar relitigation of the polity's right by others, then that right 
is not really at stake in such a way as to form the basis for a case. It is 
far from clear, moreover, that Congress has the power to remedy this 
problem by authorizing private citizens to represent the public in 
165. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 1 1  (1998). 
166. See supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying 
note 159 (suggesting that under the contrary view, Congress would be able to authorize 
federal courts to issue what amount to "advisory opinions"). Critics of modern standing 
doctrine correctly observe that in order to apply this idea, courts must distinguish between 
the sorts of real-world interests that are capable of supporting private litigation ("rights of 
persons or property") and other sorts of real-world interests that are not capable of 
supporting litigation (such as outrage at the mere thought of law-breaking by governmental 
officials). To thoroughgoing positivists, this distinction is bound to seem arbitrary. See, e.g. , 
Fletcher, supra note 12, at 233 (correctly noting that modern standing doctrine rests on the 
same kind of judicial categorization of harms as old forms of substantive due process); 
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 191 (same). Indeed, even those of us 
willing to take guidance from common law traditions will surely be unable to draw 
completely satisfactory lines. Still, the fact that modem standing doctrine requires such line­
drawing does not call its historical bona fides into question; earlier generations of Americans 
would not have recoiled at the notion of what Professor Sunstein calls "prelegal 'injuries.' " 
See Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, supra note 5, at 1451. 
167. For instance, there is no historical tradition of statutes giving each private citizen an 
independent right to bring suit on his own behalf over such harms, unaffected by judgments 
rendered in any other private citizen's suit over the same harms. Even qui tam actions are no 
exception to this principle. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162 (noting that 
the judgment secured by the first qui tam relator, whether he won or lost, was "a bar to all 
others, and conclusive even to the king himself"). 
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court, such that the whole polity will be bound by whatever judgment 
the first "citizen suit" produces. Even if one could otherwise read this 
sort of power into the Necessary and Proper Clause,168 scholars have 
pointed out that the Appointments Clause of Article II may restrict 
Congress's ability to set up shadow governments to enforce public 
rights.169 The Supreme Court has suggested that only "Officers of the 
United States" can be authorized to "conduct[] civil litigation in the 
courts of the United States for vindicating public rights,"170 and neither 
self-appointment nor appointment by Congress is among the 
constitutionally permissible methods for the selection of such 
officers.171 
B. What Does the History of Qui Tam Statutes Tell Us? 
For critics of standing doctrine, the history of qui tam statutes 
decisively refutes arguments that Congress may not delegate to private 
individuals the right to litigate on behalf of the public. In England, 
when a statute defined a public duty and prescribed a monetary 
168. Cf Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297 (1993) (arguing 
that separation-of-powers concerns restrict the kinds of laws that are "proper" within the 
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original 
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 351-52 (2002) (interpreting Articles I and II to keep Congress 
from authorizing private attorneys general to enforce federal law). 
169. Professor Hartnett, whose discussion of federal criminal prosecutions we have 
invoked above, does not reject this possibility. To the contrary, he concludes that "what is 
truly at stake in current standing doctrine is not the meaning of Article III, but the meaning 
of Article II," and that the key question is "Who can constitutionally be empowered to 
represent such public interests in court?" Hartnett, supra note 4, at 2256, 2258; see also id. at 
2257 ("I do not attempt to resolve that debate, or even to enter into it."). We agree with 
Professor Hartnett that this is one of the central questions of standing doctrine, although we 
are of two minds about localizing it in Article II; one of us (Nelson) largely accepts 
Hartnett's way of framing the issue, while the other (Woolhandler) sees more independent 
work for Article III to do and resists reducing separation-of-powers issues to the analysis of 
any one article. 
170. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per curiam). 
171. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. One can accept this argument even if one does not 
embrace more extreme views of the "unitary executive," under which all exercises of the 
federal government's "executive" power must be under the supervision and control of the 
President. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 153 (1992) (deriving this view from the 
Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of 
Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (1993) (concluding that 
"Article II prohibits Congress from vesting in private parties the power to bring 
enforcement actions on behalf of the public without allowing for sufficient executive control 
over the litigation"); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges 
"Take Care" of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, Private "Enforcers, " 
and Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93, 159-68 (2001) (agreeing that 
the executive branch needs to be in charge of "the enforcement of public rights," though 
noting that Congress can let plaintiffs who have suffered "private injury" bring suit over 
violations of federal environmental statutes (emphasis omitted)). 
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penalty for its breach, the whole penalty ordinarily was assumed to be 
payable to the crown. 172 But Parliament sometimes specifically 
provided that a private informer who brought suit upon the statute 
could share in the judgment, with part of the penalty going to him and 
the balance going either to the crown's general revenues or to some 
other public purpose identified by the statute. Suits of this sort were 
called qui tam actions.173 
From the sixteenth century on, qui tam statutes and the informers 
who used them were generating substantial criticism.174 Still, like 
private prosecution more generally, the qui tam mechanism made its 
way across the Atlantic to the American colonies. Unlike other forms 
of private prosecution, moreover, this device can claim some support 
from early federal practice: the First Congress enacted a handful of 
qui tam statutes, and a few more followed in subsequent years.175 
Critics of standing doctrine properly emphasize these statutes as 
telling evidence for their position.176 
Although the early qui tam statutes do not undercut our claim that 
the public was the only proper plaintiff to litigate diffuse harms to the 
public as a whole, 177 they undoubtedly support the notion that 
172. See 'ESPINASSE, supra note 19, at 8-10; see also, e.g. , Fleming v. Bailey, 102 Eng. 
Rep. 1090, 1091 (K.B. 1804) (Ellenborough, C.J.) ("A common informer can have no right 
to sue for any penalty, but where power is given to him for that purpose by the statute."). 
173. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160 (noting that the informer was 
someone "qui tam pro domino rege . . .  quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur" - who acts as 
much for the lord the king as for himself). On occasion, indeed, Parliament provided that the 
informer who launched the suit could keep the entire penalty. Suits under such statutes were 
sometimes called "popular" actions, id. , but we will lump them together with regular qui 
tam suits. 
174. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 573-89 (2000) (cataloguing complaints); see also id. at 589-
608 (noting that after a period in which Parliament enacted few new qui tam statutes, 
Parliament returned to the device in the eighteenth century, but that the device fell out of fa­
vor again in the nineteenth century). Qui tam actions have now been "expelled from English 
law." Id. at 608 (discussing the Common Informers Act of 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 39). 
175. See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 
387 & n.37 (providing citations). 
176. See, e.g. , Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that 
early qui tam statutes, and the lack of contemporaneous constitutional objections to them, 
operate as "extremely powerful evidence that Article III did not impose constraints on 
Congress' power to grant standing to strangers"); Cass R. Sunstein, Article // Revisionism, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 131,  135 (1993) (arguing for the same reason that "the historical evidence cuts 
very hard against the invocation of Article II"); Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia 
Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 155, 160 
(2001) [hereinafter Winter, Justice Scalia J (agreeing that early qui tam actions "give the lie to 
the Court's Article III jurisprudence" and "also refute the claim that the Framers intended 
to give the President sole and conclusive authority over the enforcement of the laws"). 
177. See supra note 167 (noting that judgment in a qui tam action bound the public 
rather than simply the individual relator); see also, e.g. , Constitutionality of the Qui Tam 
Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 207, 222 (1989) (observing 
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Congress could authorize private citizens to initiate and conduct 
litigation on behalf of the public. But early qui tam statutes do not 
settle this point or demonstrate a determinate "original 
understanding" of the constitutional separation of powers. Because 
American-style separation of powers had never been put into practical 
operation before the 1780s, members of the First Congress could not 
possibly have grasped all of the questions that it raised, let alone 
worked out coherent answers to them. The constitutional text itself 
did not fully specify the relationships among the branches of the 
federal government, and neither did any canonical political theory to 
which all members of the founding generation subscribed.178 At most, 
then, the early qui tam statutes provide some legislative precedents 
that arguably started the process of "liquidating" the Constitution's 
meaning on these debatable points.179 
Those precedents, moreover, are far from overwhelming. At the 
outset, it is worth noting that the defendants in qui tam actions usually 
were private parties rather than governmental officials, and it was in 
the latter context that the nineteenth-century Supreme Court most 
explicitly referred to the Constitution in restricting the standing of 
private parties. Thus, one might start by cabining the relevance of qui 
tam: even if federal courts should be more flexible when assessing 
statutorily authorized suits against private defendants, the private­
rights model might still be appropriate when individual plaintiffs are 
asking courts to direct the conduct of governmental officials.180 
that qui tam relators "historically were understood to be suing in a representative capacity" 
on behalf of the public at large). 
178. See, e.g. , Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions 
and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 213 (1989) ("[B]y the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, no single doctrine using the label of separation of powers had emerged 
that could command general assent."). 
179. For discussion of the "liquidation" process by which many members of the 
founding generation expected the Constitution's indeterminacies to be resolved, see Caleb 
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-29 (2003). 
Note, however, that if members of Congress simply copied the qui tam device unreflectively 
from state or English practice, the statutes that they enacted might carry little weight in that 
process. See, e.g. , Letter from James Madison to President Monroe (Dec. 27, 1817), in 3 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 54, 55-56 (J.B. Lippincott 1865) 
(arguing that early statutes should not be understood to resolve constitutional questions 
when "the question of Constitutionality was but slightly, if at all, examined by the [enacting 
Congress]"); see also Nelson, supra, at 527-28 (citing additional authorities for the same 
point). 
180. Cf Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 176-77 (acknowledging 
that this distinction is "not entirely implausible" and arguing simply that it does not flow 
from Article III, but rather from elsewhere in the Constitution). The distinction noted in the 
text is also capable of handling the critics' favorite mandamus case. In Union Pacific 
Railroad v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1875), the relators were proceeding against a private railroad 
company rather than a governmental entity, and the Supreme Court's dicta were 
correspondingly limited. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (discussing Hall). 
728 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:689 
Even as to suits against private defendants, moreover, critics of 
standing doctrine have perhaps exaggerated the extent of federal qui 
tam litigation. To justify treating qui tam practice as significant 
evidence of the original understanding of the Constitution, Professor 
Winter asserts that suits brought by qui tam informers under federal 
law were "common and ordinary,"181 and indeed that private 
enforcement of federal penal statutes was "the norm rather than the 
exception."182 This claim, however, seems to rest upon a questionable 
reading of a single sentence in an early Marshall Court opinion.183 In 
fact, the qui tam statutes adopted by the First Congress gave rise to 
little actual litigation,184 and subsequent Congresses rarely used the 
device.185 
It is true, as the Supreme Court noted in 1905, that " [l]egislation 
giving an interest in [a statutory] forfeiture to a common informer has 
been frequent in Congressional legislation relating to revenue 
cases."186 But while the collection of customs duties was certainly an 
important feature of early federal practice, and while early statutes did 
offer private informants a share of the penalties that the government 
collected from people who sought to evade those duties,187 these 
181. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1409. 
182. Winter, Justice Scalia, supra note 176, at 156. 
183. Professor Winter's authority is Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805), one 
of the very few qui tam cases considered by the Marshall Court. In the course of his opinion 
(which read a limitations statute expansively in order to reject the qui tam claim), Chief 
Justice Marshall observed that " (a]lmost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may 
be recovered by an action of debt as well as by information . . . . " Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 
at 341. For Winter and other critics, this stray sentence is proof that private "action[s] of 
debt" to enforce federal penal statutes were routine. This reading rests on the assumption 
that public prosecutors could recover statutory penalties only through criminal process, and 
hence that the "action(s] of debt" to which Marshall was referring must have been qui tam 
suits. See, e.g., Evan Carninker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 
342 n.3 (1989) (adding bracketed language to render Marshall's sentence as follows: "Almost 
every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt (by qui 
tam plaintiffs] as well as by information (by the public prosecutor]"). This assumption, 
however, is wrong; federal district attorneys could bring actions of debt to collect statutory 
penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 
16,750); United States v. Allen, 24 F. Cas. 772 (C.C.D. Conn. 1810) (No. 14,431); see also 
Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1871) (noting the settled rule 
"that debt will lie, at the suit of the United States, to recover the penalties and forfeitures 
imposed by statutes"). Thus, Marshall's opinion in Adams says nothing to suggest that qui 
tam actions were widespread in the federal courts of the early Republic. 
184. See Beck, supra note 174, at 541-42; see also id. at 542 n.8 (reporting the 
infrequency with which the phrase "qui tam" appears in Westlaw's "ALLFEDS-OLD" 
database). 
185. See Bales, supra note 175, at 387. 
186. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (rejecting a federal constitutional 
challenge to a state law that authorized "proceedings in the nature of qui tam actions"). 
187. See, e.g., Collection Act of 1799, § 91, 1 Stat. 627, 697; Collection Act of 1789, § 38, 
1 Stat. 29, 48. 
February 2004] Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 729 
statutes are not important examples of qui tam practice at the federal 
level. For the most part, the early Collection Acts simply provided for 
private informers to receive a financial reward after the official 
collector of customs successfully brought suit upon their 
information.188 
To the extent that qui tam practice seems entrenched in federal 
law, it is mostly because of a single statute.189 Although it was enacted 
during the Civil War, the qui tam provision in the federal False Claims 
Act produced little litigation before 1930.190 Indeed, when a brief 
wavelet of suits arose between 1930 and 1943, Congress responded 
with statutory amendments that "all but eliminated the use of the 
FCA qui tam."191 As a result of amendments adopted in 1986, 
188. The first Collection Act made this arrangement clear: 
[A]ll penalties accruing by any breach of this act, shall be sued for and recovered with 
costs of suit, in the name of the United States, . . .  by the collector of the district where 
the same accrued, and not otherwise, unless in cases of penalty relating to an officer of 
the customs; and such collector shall be, and hereby is authorized and directed to sue for 
and prosecute the same to effect, and to distribute and pay the sum recovered . . . 
according to law. 
Collection Act of 1789, § 36, 1 Stat. at 47. Later statutes, though less explicit, seem to have 
continued this practice. See Collection Act of 1799, § 89, 1 Stat. at 695; see also United States 
v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 290 (1825) (discussing this statute and noting that "[i]t is 
made the duty of the Collector to prosecute"). 
Under the Collection Acts, the collector himself also received a portion of the recovery 
generated by suits that he prosecuted for the government. See Collection Act of 1799, § 91, 1 
Stat. at 697 (providing for half of the recovery to go to the federal Treasury and the balance 
to be divided among the collector, certain other enforcement officers, and any informer); 
Collection Act of 1789, § 38, 1 Stat. at 48. This arrangement looks odd to modem eyes, but it 
operated as part of the collector's compensation; it was common in the early Republic for 
government officials to be paid from fees generated by their work. See LEONARD D. WHITE, 
THE FEDERALISTS 406, 413 (1948) (noting that the U.S. Attorneys and Marshals were paid 
by fees); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS 388 (1951) (indicating that many federal 
law-enforcement officials continued to be paid by fees). As the Supreme Court made clear, 
the collector who prosecuted suits for statutory penalties was doing so "as the agent of the 
government" rather than as a private citizen. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 290. Vesting the 
collector with authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the American people, moreover, 
raises no constitutional problems; the collector was a purely executive officer "subject to the 
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, who may direct the prosecution to cease." Id. In a 
conscious departure from English practice, indeed, the Supreme Court held that the 
Secretary of the Treasury could remit the statutory penalties at any stage of the litigation, 
thereby releasing the share that would have gone to the collector as well as the share that 
would have gone to the Treasury. See id. at 290-92; see also id. at 302 (Johnson, J., 
concurring) (criticizing the losing side's "attempt to modify the operation of our laws, and to 
regulate the rights and powers of our officers, by some fancied analogy with the British laws 
of trade, and British revenue officers"). 
189. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 & 
n.1 (2000) (noting that the U.S. Code contains "[t)hree other qui tam statutes," but that the 
qui tam provision in the False Claims Act is "the most frequently used"); Valerie R. Park, 
Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government: Which is the Real Party 
to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1991) (agreeing that "the only significant 
federal qui tam provision" is the one in the False Claims Act). 
190. See Bales, supra note 175, at 389. 
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however, qui tam actions under the False Claims Act have become a 
significant part of federal practice.192 
A constitutional challenge to the False Claims Act recently 
reached the Supreme Court, and the Court largely ducked. As 
analyzed by the Court, the Act's qui tam provisions do two things: 
they make the private relator "the statutorily designated agent of the 
United States" (with respect to the portion of the recovery that will go 
to the Treasury) and they partially assign to him a chose in action 
previously owned in full by the government (with respect to the 
portion of the recovery that the relator gets to keep ).193 The Court 
held that if Congress has the power to do these things, then the 
resulting suits can proceed in federal court; the public certainly has 
standing to seek to recover public money that defendants obtained by 
fraud, and someone suing pursuant to a valid assignment can benefit 
from the assignor's standing. 194 But the Court explicitly reserved 
judgment as to whether Congress can authorize private citizens to act 
as attorneys in fact for the public, or can seek to achieve the same 
result by purporting to effect a "partial assignment" of the 
government's claims to a private individual.195 As one might infer from 
the Court's willingness to leave this question open, the qui tam 
statutes passed by the early Congresses were neither so numerous nor 
so significant as to settle the constitutionality of federal qui tam 
provisions. 
In any event, even if historical practice really did compel the Court 
to uphold the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, and even if 
the Court were to extend this conclusion to other qui tam provisions 
too, 196 the lessons of qui tam would still be limited. The history of qui 
tam runs counter to the tradition of public control over public rights -
a tradition that, particularly at the federal level, has been far more 
191. Id. at 389-90. 
192. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL L. REV. 1, 48 (2002) ("Before 1986, 
the DOJ received about six qui tam cases per year. Since the 1986 amendments went into 
effect, and through October 30, 2000, 3326 qui tam cases have been filed and $4.024 billion 
has been recovered."). 
193. See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 772-73. 
194. See id. at 773-74. 
195. See id. at 778 n.8 (reserving judgment about whether the qui tam provisions of the 
False Claims Act violate the constitutional relationship between Congress and the executive 
branch, which is normally in charge of litigation on behalf of the public). 
196. Special provisions in the False Claims Act give the executive branch somewhat 
more control over the statutory qui tam actions than public officers in England traditionally 
enjoyed. See, e.g. , Bales, supra note 175, at 392-95 (discussing statutory provisions permitting 
the Department of Justice to intervene, and noting that " (t)he DOJ, once it has intervened, 
may end the litigation or limit the participation of the informer in several ways"). 
Proprietary interests of the sort covered by the False Claims Act, moreover, may be more 
assignable than other sorts of interests that the government can bring suit to protect. See 
Gilles, supra note 8, at 341-45 (drawing this distinction). 
February 2004] Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 731 
prominent than qui tam. Faced with these competing claims from 
history, the Court could sensibly conclude that the historical lineage of 
qui tam protects qui tam itself, but not other statutory arrangements 
that lack the same pedigree. One can portray qui tam practice as a 
decisive blow to modern standing doctrine only if one considers the 
logic of the law so inexorable that any counterexample to the general 
requirement of private injury "proves" that the Constitution has been 
understood to impose no such requirement at all.197 
For critics of modern standing doctrine, moreover, qui tam is a 
double-edged sword. Although it is the primary historical poster child 
for private litigation of public rights, it is hardly an attractive one; 
there are obvious dangers in a system that permits prosecutorial 
discretion to reside in each of 250 million autonomous decisionmakers 
who are self-appointed and out for their own financial gain. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, then, qui tam practice manifested the problems that 
led to the rejection of private criminal prosecution and the more 
general limitations on private pursuit of public rights. As early as the 
sixteenth century, Sir Edward Coke noted that some informers were 
"viperous vermin" who had used qui tam statutes "to vex and 
depauperize the subject . . .  for malice or private ends, and never for 
love of justice."198 In the United States, state courts recognized the 
penal nature of qui tam statutes and strictly construed those that came 
before them.199 According to one lawyer, indeed, "[qjui tam actions 
are judged with great jealousy, because the plaintiff does not seek to 
recover anything that he has lost, nor to redress any individual wrong, 
but only to expose the faults of his neighbor and turn them to his own 
profit. "200 
197. Cf Bellia, supra note 102, at 818 ("If historical practice is to be our guide, we must 
acknowledge not only its allowances, but its limitations as well."). To bring this point into 
sharper focus, it helps to ask whether the critics of standing jurisprudence would 
acknowledge any limits on lessons of qui tam. Suppose, for instance, that Congress went 
from authorizing qui tam suits to authorizing other forms of private prosecution: any 
"private attorney general" who believed that a federal criminal statute had been violated 
could seek an indictment and conduct the prosecution of the suspected offender, in the 
hopes of collecting a cash bounty for a successful prosecution. Would the logic of qui tam 
inevitably defeat all constitutional objections to such a scheme? Or would people come to 
agree that qui tam is at best an anomaly, and that the existence of one historically grounded 
exception to a general principle of constitutional law does not require repudiation of the 
entire principle? 
198. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *194, cited in Beck, supra note 174, at 578. 
199. See, e.g. , Leonard v. Bosworth, 4 Conn. 421, 424 (1822); Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass. 
471, 473 (1808); Washburn v. M'Inroy, 7 Johns. 134, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
200. Vaughn v. McQueen, 9 Mo. 330, 331 (1845) (argument of counsel). In Vaughn 
itself, the court was unwilling to construe the statute as narrowly as counsel wanted, but it 
did not reject the principle of strict construction. See also Taft v. Stephens Lith. & Eng. Co., 
38 F. 28, 29 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889) ("Plaintiff is not suing for the value of his services, or for 
injury to his property, but simply to make profit to himself out of the wrongs of others; and 
when a man comes in as an informer, and in that attitude alone asks to have a half million 
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As for the federal level, private qui tam actions were relatively 
rare. But even governmental officials who sought their moieties 
caused problems by attempting to pursue actions after higher-level 
officials (moved to mercy by the absence of willful violations) had 
remitted penalties.201 This historical experience tends to bear out the 
work of modern law and economics scholars who suggest that offering 
bounties for law enforcement will lead to over-enforcement.202 Such 
modern analyses reinforce traditional concerns that private discretion 
over public rights would enhance the chances for the arbitrary exercise 
of power. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to show that standing doctrine has a far 
longer history than its modern critics concede. That history, moreover, 
casts concerns about standing in a far more sympathetic light than 
most modern-day discussions suggest. Standing doctrines not only 
placed decisions about public rights in the hands of politically 
accountable officers, but often operated to protect individual citizens 
against inequitable enforcement of the law by private adventurers. 
Standing doctrine has many dimensions. One focus is on the 
particular parties before the court, and whether the rights that they 
are invoking are really theirs to control. When discretion to pursue a 
claim properly belongs to a private person who has not been made a 
party to the action, standing doctrine operates to protect that person 
against usurpation of his or her rights. Conversely, rules that preclude 
enforcement of public rights by private citizens operate to protect the 
dollars put into his pocket, the courts will never strain a point to make his labors light, or his 
recovery easy."). 
201. See, e.g. , United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246 (1825) (holding that the 
collector and surveyor of Portlai!d, Maine, were not entitled to their moiety after the 
Treasury Secretary's statutorily authorized determination to remit the fine for lack of willful 
negligence or intention to defraud). The Court was concerned that the executive maintain 
control over public rights and that the objects of enforcement receive relief for excusable 
violations. See id. at 291, 296; see also id. at 302-03 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson 
noted that he had seen many similar cases on circuit. Id. at 296; see also The Laura, 1 14 U.S. 
411 (1885) (holding that where a statute empowered the Secretary to remit fines, the right of 
the informer was inchoate and subject to the Secretary's power of remission before the right 
was ascertained and established by the court). 
202 See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 15, 38 (responding to Gary S. Becker & 
George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974), which recommended private enforcement of criminal law). Landes 
and Posner surmised that where there was incomplete apprehension, a legislature might set a 
fine higher than social costs of the activity to minimize enforcement costs. Such enhanced 
fines, however, would lead private prosecutors to devote more resources to apprehension. 
See id. at 15.  Prosecutors motivated by the prospect of financial gain will also have little 
interest in reining in the penal law's tendency toward overbreadth. See id. at 38. 
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political process and to prevent dissenting individuals from making 
end runs around it. 
At the same time, the issue of standing necessarily implicates the 
proper role of the judiciary in a democratic government and the 
relationship between that government and individual defendants. 
Exercise of judicial power at the instance of an improper plaintiff risks 
injecting the judiciary prematurely in decisions that are not its to 
make. By the same token, defendants have interests in freedom from 
judicial coercion at the instance of a private citizen who has no private 
rights at stake. 
Because of the multidimensionality of standing disputes, standing 
doctrine implicates not only Article III but also a variety of other 
constitutional concerns, including the relationships among all three 
branches of the federal government, the relationship between the 
federal government and the states, and the demands of due process.203 
That there may be many ways to restate a standing problem perhaps 
manifests the fundamental nature, in a regime of limited government, 
of the distinction between public and private rights. 
Standing critics speak in glowing terms about the desirability of 
allowing private citizens to litigate public rights. In the words of 
Professor Winter, " [o]nly this model affirms the ability of the 
individual citizen to be heard above the din of pluralistic, self­
interested, majoritarian politics, and to participate directly in the 
normative process."204 Our governmental institutions, however, have 
developed upon a different premise: the unique advantage of the 
courts lies in protecting private rights, not in representing the public 
more wisely than the political branches can. 
203. Our inclusion of due process in this list might seem peculiar. But at least in modern 
times, private prosecution of certain criminal offenses would surely raise some such 
concerns. Cf , e.g., State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (concluding 
that even when a prosecution remains nominally under the control of public officers, the 
participation of the victim's civil lawyers as co-counsel violates the Due Process Clause). 
Potential due process issues also arise when a private party seeks to litigate the right of 
another private person who has not been brought into the proceedings. Thus, concerns 
about the absence of "indispensable" parties, or about the res judicata effect of judgments 
on absent parties, are often cast in terms of due process. 
204. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1508. 
